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 There is a growing number of studies that investigate the effect of trade 
liberalization on productivity and nearly all assume that trade policy is independently 
determined of productivity, hence it is exogenous. I show that this assumption is 
generally invalid both theoretically and empirically. In Chapter 1, I demonstrate that 
under a standard political economy model of trade protection, productivity directly 
influences tariffs. Moreover, this productivity-tariff relationship partly determines the 
extent of liberalization across sectors even in the presence of a large exogenous unilateral 
liberalization shock that affects all sectors. In Chapter 2, I examine total factor 
productivity (TFP) estimates obtained at the firm level for Colombia between 1983 and 
1998 and find that more productive sectors receive more protection within this period. In 
estimating the effect of productivity on tariffs, I control for the endogeneity of the inverse 
import penetration to import demand elasticity ratio and productivity. Finally, I use a 
system of equations to illustrate that the positive impact of liberalization on productivity 
grows somewhat stronger when corrected for the endogeneity bias.  
 In Chapter 3, which is joint with Nuno Limão, we analyze the effect of 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on multilateral trade liberalization (MTL). PTAs 
are characterized by liberalization with respect to only a few partners and thus can 
potentially retard multilateral trade liberalization (MTL). Despite this important concern, 
there is almost no systematic evidence as to whether PTAs actually affect MTL or not. 
We model the effect of PTAs on MTL and show that PTAs slow down MTL unless they 
involve a common external tariff and allow for internal transfers. Next, we use detailed 
data on product-level tariffs negotiated by the European Union (EU) in the last two 
multilateral trade rounds to structurally estimate our model. We confirm the main 
prediction–the EU’s PTAs have clashed with its MTL–and find that the effect is 
quantitatively significant. Moreover, we also confirm several auxiliary predictions of the 
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The effect of trade policy on productivity is a major issue in development and interna-
tional trade economics. The interest in this issue is not new and the papers on this issue date
back to the 1950s (e.g. Johnson 1955).1 We recently see an increased interest in the topic
through the ever-growing number of empirical studies testing the effect of trade liberaliza-
tion on productivity (e.g. Tybout and Westbrook 1995, Pavcnik 2002, Schor 2004). Many
developing countries (for example, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, India, Mexico, and Turkey)
have aggressively pursued trade liberalization in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, in part,
to boost productivity. So, does trade liberalization really increase productivity? Recent
micro-level empirical findings indicate that the answer is “Yes.” However nearly all these
studies fail to recognize that trade policy might be endogenous with respect to productivity.
And, even if they acknowledge the existence of this endogeneity, most do not control for it.
I show, theoretically in Chapter 1 and empirically in Chapter 2, that productivity directly
affects trade policy. Thus, a concern for the endogeneity bias is well-founded. Moreover,
when we account for the bi-directional causality between trade policy and productivity, the
positive effect of trade reform on productivity may become stronger.
In Chapter 3, which is joint with Nuno Limão, we look at the effect of preferential trade
agreements (PTAs) on multilateral trade liberalization (MTL). Over 130 PTAs were formed
in the last ten years–more than in the previous 50 years combined. Nearly all countries are
currently members of at least one PTA and nearly a third of world trade is carried out under
such agreements. Although most economists favor MTL, there is no such consensus on
the desirability of preferential liberalization. The original concern with PTAs was their
ambiguous effect on welfare: positive if the preferential partner is more efficient than the
rest of the world but negative otherwise (Viner 1950). During the late 1980s and early
1990s, MTL was stalled while the United States and the European Union pursued PTAs,
1A detailed historical review of the papers that are concerned with the effects of trade on industrial per-
formance appears in Pack (1988). He suggests that the early evidence is rather mixed.
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generating much debate on whether PTAs are a “building block” or a “stumbling block”
towards MTL (Bhagwati 1991). This issue is also prominent in the current multilateral
round since several developing countries fear that MTL will erode the preferences provided
to them.2
An important source of concern with PTAs is that they can hurt non-members. One
direct channel by which this occurs is if the PTA members divert their import demand
away from the non-members and this effect is large enough to reduce non-members’ ex-
port prices. There is evidence of trade diversion and also some direct evidence that PTAs
do lower export prices for non-members.3 This and other costs to the non-members due
to discrimination disappear if the preference is fully eroded by MTL. Thus, it is crucial
to determine if PTAs hold back MTL and entrench these costs, particularly given that two
thirds of world trade is still not covered by any preferences. After much debate there is
still no theoretical consensus about and scant empirical evidence of a “clash of liberaliza-
tions”. We provide evidence of such a clash during the last multilateral trade round by
using product-level protection data to estimate a model of the interaction of preferential
and multilateral liberalization.
In Chapter 1, I provide a theoretical model of tariff policy determination for a small
open economy. I show that under my political economy of protection, the sectoral tariffs
depend positively on the industry production (size) and hence, on the sectoral productivity
if these sectors are organized and lobby for protection.4 The intuition for this result is that
2The latest round was launched in 2001 and according to a recent article in the leaders section of the
Economist magazine, a key factor that may lead to its collapse is that “Poor countries with preferential access
to rich world markets want to make sure that freer trade will not reduce these preferences” (“Talking the
Talk”, July 17th 2004, p.14). However, the possibility that these preferences would reduce MTL is not new:
it was a concern raised when the generalized system of preferences to developing countries was originally
proposed (Johnson 1967, p. 166).
3Chang and Winters (2002) find that Mercosur caused lower export prices for non-members. Romalis
(2004) provides evidence of trade diversion for the North American Free Trade Area and its predecessor
between the US and Canada.
4This is a modified result (as I explain later in the text) from the, now standard, political economy models
such as Grossman and Helpman (1994). The results from Grossman and Helpman (1994) have been widely
tested and confirmed. Also Ferreira and Facchini (2005), who find that more concentrated sectors receive
more protection, share a similar view with my paper in the sense that the industry characteristics matter for
trade policy.
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more productive sectors have got more to gain from lobbying and the potential to generate
more protection. More specifically, the marginal benefit of a tariff, hence a higher domestic
price is greater when it applies to more units and more productive processes.5
It is often argued that trade reform may be used as an exogenous change and this uni-
form shift in policy helps identify the effect of trade policy on productivity without wor-
rying too much about its endogeneity. In order to account for this argument, I model a
unilateral trade liberalization shock which is common across sectors. I find that under such
a common exogenous shock, the reduction in tariffs is lower for sectors that experience a
higher productivity gain (or a lower productivity decline) as compared to other sectors in
the presence of political economy. Initially, I keep the additional channel simple making
sure that it is clearly the political economy consideration that is driving the results. Next,
I give more structure to the extra channel of protection and to the way the liberalization
shock manifests itself by allowing for an infant industry argument.6 This argument led to
the widespread use of import substitution policies in most developing countries until the
mid-1980s and its dismissal was the source of much unilateral trade liberalization since
then.
In my two period model, the government initially believes that there exists a learning-
by-doing (LBD) process and decides about the current tariffs by considering both political
economy effects and the effect of these tariffs on the future welfare through LBD. In the
second period, the government realizes that LBD does not actually exist and it is a false
perception, and thus initiates a trade reform. Given that political economy forces still deter-
mine tariffs, the extent of liberalization differs across sectors (due to political economy) de-
spite this common shock across sectors. The implication from the models I present is that,
5I focus on the effect of productivity on trade policy due to political economy motivations. However, there
are other plausible channels that could actually lead to more protection (not less) for less productive sectors
as I discuss in Chapter 1. My purpose of using this standard model as the starting point is to create a tractable
setup for the effect of productivity on tariffs and then, having accounted for an economy-wide trade reform,
to ultimately obtain structural equations to test econometrically.
6For example, the infant industry argument is mentioned as an important motive for protection in Gross-
man and Horn (1988).
3
assuming cross-sectional differences in trade policy to be independent of cross-sectional
differences in productivity is incorrect.
In Chapter 2, I employ Colombian data for the 1983-1998 period to empirically test my
theory. Colombia has been used in various studies (for example, Roberts 1996; Fernandes
2003; Melendez, Seim and Medina 2003) given that it provides a great natural experiment
environment. Colombia experienced a drastic trade reform in the early 1990s and had a
stable economy in this period without major crises. Given the existence of other studies
using the same country, I get the chance to test my predictions with a comparable dataset.
I analyze the effect of productivity7 on trade protection by closely following my theory.
I confirm that (4-digit ISIC level) sectoral tariffs are inversely related to the import pene-
tration ratio and import demand elasticity, whereas they are positively related to total factor
productivity. The results also indicate that the sectors with more productivity gain (or less
productivity decline), as compared to the other sectors, are liberalized less.
In the estimations, I account for the extra channels which I mention above and more
specifically, I account for their elimination which leads to a big decline in tariffs. For this
purpose, I allow for a shift in the common terms across sectors over time. I tackle the
potential endogeneity of the right-hand-side variables, namely inverse import penetration
to import demand elasticity ratio and productivity, by using instrumental variables. The in-
struments are capital to output ratio, materials prices, a measure of scale economies (value
added/number of firms), and the TFP of the upstream industries which I confirm to be valid
based on a test of overidentifying restrictions and also explain intuitively in Chapter 2. Fi-
nally, I estimate a system of equations for illustrative purposes. In the system, I correct
for the endogeneity of tariffs and show that the positive effect of trade liberalization on
productivity can be underestimated when endogeneity bias is not accounted for.
7My productivity estimates come from Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2004) and they are orig-
inally calculated at the firm-level which are then aggregated to the 4-digit ISIC level using production shares
of each firm. The dataset has the great advantage of using plant level input and output prices. This enables
obtaining good estimates with smaller bias as compared to the majority of the studies which need to employ
non-parametric estimations and sector level price deflators due to lack of data.
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In Chapter 3, we develop a model which builds on Limão (2002) and captures the
key features of the multilateral system and of recent PTAs. We generate several specific
predictions to test. The main one is that multilateral tariffs are higher on products that a
country imports duty-free from preferential partners (PTA good, henceforth) than on an
otherwise similar good (non-PTA good). The basic intuition for this result is the following.
Suppose the European Union (EU) offers preferential duty-free access in a set of products
to a certain country. The latter benefit from facing a lower tariff than their competitors and
the fact that the EU signs the PTA indicates that its member governments value it at given
multilateral tariffs. If the EU eliminated its multilateral tariff on that same set of products,
it would effectively eliminate the PTA that it valued. We show that this additional cost
of MTL is only present for the subset of PTA goods and affects multilateral tariff levels
only when the preferential tariff is already zero since otherwise, the preferential tariff can
be reduced to maintain the preferential margin. The model also predicts that, if there is
a common external tariff and the ability for direct cash transfers–generally present when
there is a common tariff–then no stumbling block effect appears. This occurs because
the EU can now offset any reduction in preferential margins due to MTL through a direct
transfer to the preferential partner.
We estimate the model’s structural equation for the equilibrium trade policy using de-
tailed data, at the level used in the negotiations, for thousands of products imported by
the EU. There are several compelling reasons for focusing on the EU to analyze whether
there is a clash of liberalizations. First, a key concern with PTAs is their potential to harm
non-members. Given that the EU is the world’s largest trader, its trade policy surely affects
non-members. Second, the EU’s preferential agreements are quite diverse, which allows us
to theoretically derive and test a rich set of predictions. Finally, although the EU accounts
for a fifth of world trade, there is hardly any empirical evidence on the formation of the
EU’s trade policy in general and none that analyzes how its PTAs affect its MTL.8
8Constantopoulos (1974) and Riedel (1977) examine determinants of industry level protection of indi-
vidual members before accession to the EU. Tavares (2001) analyzes the determinants of the EU’s common
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We find that the EU’s PTAs generated a stumbling block for MTL in the last trade
round. More specifically, the EU reduced its multilateral tariffs on goods not imported
under PTAs by almost twice as much as on its PTA goods, as predicted by the model.
We ensure that the results are robust to reverse causation and other possible sources of
endogeneity by employing an IV-GMM estimator and testing for the exogeneity of different
variables and the validity of their instruments. The stumbling block effect we estimate is
stronger for goods that were exported by all of the EU’s PTA partners. Moreover, the effect
is not present for goods with a positive preferential tariff and in agreements with a common
external tariff and transfers, which are two important auxiliary predictions from our model.
Various robustness tests provide further support for the baseline estimates.
The results are also economically significant. The estimates imply that the average price
effect due to the EU’s multilateral tariff changes was only about half for PTA goods relative
to other goods. Moreover, according to the theoretical model, our estimate represents not
only the current wedge in the tariffs between PTA and non-PTA goods but also what the
actual tariff wedge for this set of PTA goods would be relative to the counterfactual where
the EU has no preferences for that same set of goods. That wedge is about 1.4 percent-
age points whereas the current average tariff for PTA goods in our sample is 4.7 percent.
This evidence along with the stumbling block effect estimated for the US in Limão (2006)
suggest that we should be concerned about a “clash of liberalizations”.9
Reciprocity is a key feature not only of our model but also of the leading economic
external tariff, also at the industry level. We are not aware of any paper that either estimates the determinants
of protection for the EU at the product level or does so structurally.
9It is possible that, in other countries, PTAs lead to lower protection against non-members. Foroutan
(1998) finds lower average MFN tariffs for Latin American countries with PTAs after the Uruguay Round.
She agrees that no causality can be drawn from such a correlation because those countries were moving away
from import substitution during the 90’s, which implied considerable unilateral liberalization independently
of any effects from PTAs. This issue of causation is partially addressed by Bohara, Gawande and Sanguinetti
(2004) who estimate that the Argentine unilateral tariffs were lower in industries where the value of imports
from Mercosur to value added in Argentina was highest. Neither paper models MTL in the context of a trade
round so, even if we set causation issues aside, there is no systematic evidence that PTAs lead to more MTL.
Even if such evidence is found for Latin American and some other countries, it will be difficult to overturn
the concern that PTAs slow down MTL because the current evidence supports this conclusion for two of the
largest traders, the EU and the US, which have generally been the focus of the controversy.
6
theory of the GATT (Bagwell and Staiger 1999). Although reciprocity is supposed to be
an important principle in multilateral negotiations, some economists question whether it is
followed in practice (Finger, Reincke, and Castro 1999). We empirically model the mul-
tilateral negotiation process and address the endogeneity issue associated with reciprocal
tariff reductions. Our estimates indicate that reciprocity was followed: the EU’s tariff re-
ductions were largest for products exported by countries that provided greater increases in
market access. Finally, we model and provide novel evidence of the EU’s internal politi-
cal economy determinants of trade policy. The EU places some, but not much, additional
weight on producer than consumer welfare. In this respect our findings are similar to struc-
tural estimates of the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model that also find small values for the
US.10
10See Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000).
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1 Productivity Matters for Trade Policy: The Theory
1.1 Basic Model
The output and factor markets are perfectly competitive. The numeraire good, i = 0,
is produced with labor only, using a constant returns to scale process, whereas the non-
numeraire goods, i = 1, ...n, are produced using labor and one sector-specific factor. The
production function for the non-numeraire goods is Xi(pi) = AiQi(pi),11 where Ai stands
for the Hicks-neutral total factor productivity (TFP). The international prices for all goods
i = 0, ..., N , denoted by pwi , are normalized to one. Furthermore, assuming a large enough
aggregate supply of labor, the wage rate is also tied at one–the marginal revenue produc-
tivity of labor in the numeraire sector.
The numeraire good is traded freely, hence its domestic price is equal to the world price
of one. The owners of each specific factor organize into lobbies, and ask for government
protection in their own sector only since they are assumed to constitute a negligible share
of the total population. The consumers cannot overcome the free-rider problem and are
not organized as discussed in Olson (1965). For simplification, export subsidies are not
allowed and only tariffs are available for trade protection.12 Maintaining the small country
assumption and the world prices normalized to 1, the domestic price of the remaining goods
are given by pi = 1+ τ i, where τ i denotes both the specific and the advalorem tariff rate.13
The government, then, sets its trade policy by maximizing the following political support
function
G ≡ L+PNi=1µZ ∞
1+τ i
Di(τ i)dτ i + ω
Z 1+τ i
0
AiQi(τ i)dτ i + τ iMi(τ i)
¶
(1)
11In Chapter 2, I give Qi(pi) more structure. Here, it just indicates part of the production function inde-
pendent of productivity.
12The trade with the rest of the world is balanced through movements of the numeraire good.
13Note that the domestic price for a small economy is related to the world price and tariff rates with
pi = (p
w
i +specific tariff ) = pwi (1+advalorem tariff ) but the assumption that pwi = 1 makes the specific and
advalorem rates equal under this case.
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whereL is the aggregate labor supply and income; Di(τ i) is the aggregate demand, Xi(τ i) =
AiQi(τ i) is the aggregate supply, and Mi(τ i) = Di(τ i)−AiQi(τ i) is the aggregate import
demand for good i. Thus, G is a weighted sum of the aggregate consumer and producer
suplus, as well as labor income and tariff revenue.14 The weight, ω ≥ 1, represents the
relative importance given to the producer surplus with respect to the rest of the social wel-
fare.15
Given the additive separability of the government objective, we can obtain the optimal
tariff rate for sector i by maximizing equation (1) with respect to τ i. Consequently, the
equilibrium specific and advalorem tariff rates for sector i are implicitly defined as16
τ i = (ω − 1)AiQi(τ i)/Mi(τ i)
εi(τ i)
(2)
where εi(.) stands for the elasticity of import demand.17 This expression is a standard one
obtained in various political economy models (Helpman 1997). Accordingly, the tariff rate
for sector i is an increasing function of the extra political economy weight provided to pro-
ducers, whereas it is a decreasing function of the import demand elasticity, εi, and import
penetration ratio, Mi/AiQi. A tariff is a tax on imports, so just like a tax on a non-traded
good, the deadweight loss created is lower the more inelastic the (import) demand is. Thus,
a smaller value of εi allows for higher tariffs to be applied. In addition, a relatively larger
market for imports creates a greater price distortion potential which should be avoided by
the government. Finally, the marginal benefit of a tariff is higher when it applies to more
units and more productive processes.
14The tariff revenue,
PN
i=1 τ iMi(.), is fully rebated back to the public in a lump-sum manner.
15This setup can be easily interpreted as a reduced form of a model where lobbying is given micro-
foundations such as in Grossman and Helpman (1994). I prefer to take a shortcut here to keep the focus
on the main subject matter: trade policy and productivity link in the presence of unilateral liberalization.
16Again note that the specific (first term) and advalorem (second term) tariff rates are equivalent since the
international prices are normalized to one. See the appendix section A for the derivation of equation (2).
17Here, the import demand elasticity is defined as εi ≡ −M 0ipwi /Mi, so it differs from the standard
definition which is evaluated at the domestic price. I account for this in the empirical estimations as explained
in the appendix section B.1.
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Partially and implicitly differentiating equation (2) with respect to Ai, we obtain the
following relationships between tariff protection and productivity
∂τ i
∂Ai





= − (ω − 1)Qi(τ i)
M 0i(τ i) + (ω − 1)AiQ0i(τ i)
> 0 (3b)
I assume that Qi(τ i), Di(τ i) and hence, Mi(τ i) are linear for ease of exposition (i.e.
Q00i (τ i) = D
00
i (τ i) = 0).18 Although initially ω ≥ 1 is the only restriction on the value
of ω, I further assume it to be bounded above such that ω < 2 − D0i(.)
AiQ0i(.)
based on the
observations from the empirical political economy literature. For example, Goldberg and
Maggi (1999) estimate ω to be equal to 1.014 for the United States, whereas Karacaovali
and Limão (2005b) estimate it to be between 1.0025 and 1.0039 for the European Union.
Although these estimates might be a bit small, they more than support my parameter re-
striction as a plausible one. If ω were so high to exceed 2− D0i(.)
AiQ0i(.)
19, then more productivity
would call for less protection. Under our political economy setup, this would be counter-
intuitive given that a high ω together with a high Ai only indicate a stronger lobby and
require more protection, not less.
The main result is that, based on a standard political economy model, we expect an or-
ganized sector with higher productivity to receive more protection because it has got more
to gain for a marginal increase in the tariff rate, hence the domestic price level. Thus, this
is a slight modification of the size effect identified by the influential work of Grossman and
Helpman (1994) which has been tested and confirmed in various papers (like Gawande and
Bandyopadhyay 2000, Goldberg and Maggi 1999, Mitra et al. 2002 and so on). More im-
portantly, this basic observation naturally raises doubts about the assumption of exogeneity
of trade policy with respect to productivity in the earlier empirical literature.
18I have the same assumption throughout the text. This is not a necessary condition for the inequality in
equation (3b) to hold or the other results to follow.
19Note that D0i(.) < 0.
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Before I extend this basic setup by introducing common shocks, I should note that we
could potentially have a channel working in the opposite direction. That is, one can plau-
sibly expect a less productive sector to obtain more protection. One way to model this is
by allowing the political economy weight to differ across sectors based on certain sectoral
characteristics as in Karacaovali and Limão (2005a).20 For example, a sector with a higher
share of employment is likely to have a higher weight given that it generates more political
votes (Caves 1976). Or, sectors with lower wages may have a higher weight due to govern-
ment and society-wide sympathy with their situation or simply because low wage workers
have a lower opportunity cost of lobbying (Magee et al. 1989). Typically, low wage and
labor intensive sectors are less productive so this could potentially reverse the results. I
exclude such concerns from my model because I want to focus on the effect of productivity
on tariffs in the presence of a big trade reform shock that affects all sectors and accounting
for further sector characteristics would only complicate this analysis. Furthermore, I would
like to obtain a tractable parsimonious econometric model from this theoretical setup. For
example, I allow for such differences across sectors that could lead to different initial tariff
rates by considering fixed effects in my estimations (Chapter 2).
1.2 Trade Reform
Nearly all the papers examining the trade reform-productivity linkage involve a period of
unilateral liberalization which is usually considered to be an exogenous shock independent
of productivity and common across sectors. Then, the exogeneity of the liberalization
shock is used to defend the argument that we should not be worried about the endogeneity
of trade policy. Therefore, I provide room for a unilateral liberalization motive common
across sectors in order to create a similar setup and analyze its effects. We would like to see
whether such a common shock does indeed produce a proportional, non-selective decline
in tariffs.
20In Grossman and Helpman (1994) we get a constant weight, such as the one I have.
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In order to capture this common and exogenous shock argument, I simply augment the
baseline government objective function, G, with an additional term, Σ(τ ) = α
PN
i=1 σi(τ i).
This extra term does not create a different economic structure, that is we still have con-
sumers with quasilinear utility functions, a constant returns to scale production with no
spillovers and so on. The government objective function can now be expressed as
Γ ≡ G+ αPNi=1 σi(τ i) (4)
where G is the same as in equation (1), σi(.) is increasing in τ i (and concave), and α > 0 is
a constant. Σ(τ ) is meant to capture the government perceived benefit of using protective
trade policy and would call for protection even in the absence of lobbying. One can think
of the perceived benefit as a government view that favors import substitution or as an un-
questioned historical legacy of trade protectionism. Initially, I use this approach to be able
to clearly show that the tariff changes and levels depend on the productivity changes and
levels even under the simplest setup of trade reform. However, in the next sub-section, I
put more structure on the way liberalization manifests itself by modeling an infant industry
argument, which is known to be a crucial protection motive for developing countries.
The equilibrium tariff rate obtained by maximizing equation (4) is given by21






The first part of the expression in equation (5) is essentially the same as equation (2). The
additional σ0i term, on the other hand, captures the marginal perceived benefit of tariffs,
again weighted by imports and import demand elasticity. I assume that the σ0i terms are
identical across sectors in order to get a uniform effect, that is σ0i = σ0j for i 6= j. As I show
21The derivation is similar to the one for equation (2), so it is omitted.
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Many developing countries, including Colombia, have gone through significant unilat-
eral trade liberalization in the late 1980s through early 1990s. Moreover, it is often argued
that such liberalization episodes can be interpreted as an exogenous shock mostly uniform
across sectors. Thus, empirical researchers regress productivity on tariffs by exploiting this
variation over time maintaining an exogeneity assumption. Now, I model such a unilat-
eral liberalization shock as a dramatic decline in the parameter α, say, all the way down
to zero.22 Note that, this shock is modeled to be common across sectors on purpose and
it does not depend on any industry characteristics. Yet, as we will see below, the political
economy motives still affect tariffs so that the reduction in tariffs for a sector depends on
the change in its level of production or size and hence, its productivity.
∆τ it+1 ≡ τ it+1|α=0 − τ it|α>0 (7)
= −(ω − 1)Ait+1Qit+1(τ it+1)
M 0it+1(τ it+1)
+





Then, using the linearity of Mi,23 equation (7) can be re-expressed as






The partial effect of Ait on τ it is the same as given in equation (3a). Now, we also obtain
22This change could be due to a contingent loan from the IMF or a policy recommendation from the World
Bank which require certain stabilization and liberalization policies from our “small” country. Or it could be
due to a change in the paradigm having observed the success of other comparable liberalizing countries and a
new international consensus degrading import substitution type policies. For example, Edwards (1997) ana-
lyzes the role of the World Bank in its effect on trade liberalization reforms and acknowledges its contribution
through research and policy dialogue.
23I assume that the paramaters do not change over time, and combining with the earlier linearity assumption
we get M 0it+1(.) =M 0it(.) =M 0i(.).
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the following relationships between tariffs and productivity in levels and changes
dτ it
dAit
|α≥0 = − (ω − 1)Qit(τ it)




|τ it,Ait = −
(ω − 1)Qit+1(τ it+1)
M 0i(.) + (ω − 1)Ait+1Q0it+1(τ it+1)
> 0 (9b)
Equation (9a) is obtained by implicitly differentiating the first part of equation (5) (specific
tariff) with respect to Ait whereas, equation (9b) is obtained by implicitly differentiating
∆τ it+1 as expressed in equation (8) with respect to ∆Ait+1 for given initial levels of τ it
and Ait.24
We see that a sector with higher productivity is expected to receive more protection and
a sector with a bigger increase (or a lower decline) in productivity is expected to have lower
reduction in tariffs despite an exogenous shock common across sectors. Thus, we have
reasons to worry about the endogeneity of tariffs with respect to total factor productivity.
Accordingly, in the empirical studies where the sector level productivity is regressed on the
sector level tariffs that are assumed to be exogenous, there will be a direct reverse causality
problem. In the case of the firm level productivity being regressed on the sector level tariffs,
this problem will be smaller. However, to the extent that the firm level productivities of a
sector differ commonly from the firm level productivities of the other sectors or the more
correlated the firm level productivities are with the sector level productivities, the worse
the endogeneity problem will be. In Chapter 2, I use productivity estimates obtained at the
firm level that are then aggregated to the sector level using production shares as weights to
arrive at representative productivity values for each sector.
Finally, notice that the productivity-tariff linkage above is completely driven by the
political economy channel. If political economy is not a concern for the determination of
tariffs for a given sector, that is, if the extra political economy weight is null (ω − 1 = 0),
then productivity has no effect on the tariffs. On the other hand, again because of political
24Naturally, we also have ∂τ it/∂Ait > 0 and ∂∆τ it+1/∂∆Ait+1 > 0.
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economy, the reduction in tariffs varies across sectors based on productivity differences
regardless of the common shock.
1.3 Government Perceived Learning-by-Doing
In this sub-section, I provide more structure for the liberalization process and the gov-
ernment perceived benefit of protection by introducing an infant industry argument. In
developing countries, learning-by-doing and infant industry arguments have been a major
motivation for protection which should be accounted for. Grossman and Helpman (1995)
provide a comprehensive survey of the literature on technology and trade and indicate that
“some countries might wish to use trade or industrial policies to alter their patterns of spe-
cialization... The short-run income loss for such a country would be small, while the policy
would generate a permanent boost to its productivity growth...” (p. 1297). However, it
should be noted that import substitution policies and infant industry protection have been
largely abandoned especially after the 1980s and some critics have indicated that the infants
actually never seem to grow (see, e.g., Krueger and Tuncer 1982). In this spirit, the trade
liberalization episodes in the developing countries can be seen as a result of the disillusion
about the infant industry argument. That is, the governments go from strongly believing in
the argument to understanding that it does not work. I would like to examine the effect of
such a shift in the government beliefs on the structure of liberalization. Therefore, I model
a learning-by-doing (LBD) process which is merely a perception by the government.25 Al-
though there is no LBD, the government believes that there is some and thus sets its tariffs
accordingly until it changes its view by realizing that this is a false perception and then
embarks upon a trade reform.26
More specifically, the government believes that producing more today has a positive
25I gratefully acknowledge Nuno Limão for his suggestions here.
26Edwards (2001) notes that César Gaviria (President of Colombia 1990-1994) “developed from early on
a critical view regarding CEPAL’s import substitution development strategies, then in vogue in most of Latin
America.”
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impact on tomorrow’s productivity and hence takes this relationship into account while de-
termining its current trade policy. On the other hand, the firms decide about their production
by simply reacting to the prices determined by the government trade policy and their deci-
sions do not depend on any LBD process. For simplicity, I assume that the government has
a two-period policy setting horizon.27 This assumption is not only computationally conve-
nient but also helps us partially capture the real experience in Colombia28 which I study in
Chapter 2.
In this setup, I aim to provide a plausible explanation for the way unilateral liberaliza-
tion is introduced. The liberalization shock is common across sectors as in the basic model
but the government’s perceived benefit of the protection now has a specific reasoning based
on a LBD process.
I model the government objective in equation (1), but now the government has the
following belief about the form of the supply function
Xit(τ it) = Ait(φit, λit)Qit(τ it) (10)
Ait(.), like before, denotes the total factor productivity, λit = λ(Xit−1, Xit−2, ...) repre-
sents the learning-by-doing process, and φit stands for the determinants of TFP that are
independent of LBD. The government believes that λ(.) is an increasing function of past
production within the same sector, that is λ0(.) > 0. Note that the true supply function is
actually Xit(τ it) = Ait(φit)Qit(τ it). Each period, the government sets tariffs considering
their current effects on the weighted social welfare as discussed in the previous section but
now it additionally considers the perceived future effects of current tariffs via learning-by-
doing.
27One can think that the government sets trade policy quite infrequently such that tariffs are first determined
when the government believes that there exists a strong learning-by-doing process at play and later when this
perception is discarded because productivity gain is not observed or the process reaches its terminal point.
Alternatively, this might be a short lived government that expects to be in power for two periods only.
28This is a feature shared by many other developing countries such as Turkey, Brazil, and India that ex-
perienced significant amounts of liberalization around the 1983-1985, 1991-1996, and 1990-1993 periods,
respectively.
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The equilibrium tariffs for period t can be obtained as
τ̂ t ≡ argmax
τ t
[Gt + δEt(Gt+1|ιt)] (11)
where the Gj terms are defined as in equation (1) but with time subscripts and Xit(.) takes
the form in equation (10). ιt denotes the information set of the government in period t,
and δ < 1 is the time discount factor. At period t the government knows that TFP has
some baseline value Ait(.) = φit and believes that the future expected TFP is given by
Et(Ait+1(.)) = Et(φit+1λit+1) = φit+1λ(φitQit).29
Solving backwards, we obtain the tariffs for period t + 1. The realized values of these
tariffs are set after the government observes Ait+1 and finds out that there is actually no
LBD. Therefore, the actual period t+1 tariff rate is equal in its form and actual value to the
one in equation (2). On the other hand, in order to determine the tariffs set in period t, the
government needs to compute the future expected welfare which depends on the expected
period t + 1 tariffs. Given that there are two periods, the expected tariffs for period t + 1
have the standard form similar to equation (2); however, due to the LBD process, each of
its components, hence itself is expected to depend on period t tariffs
Et(τ it+1) = τ
e
it+1(τ it) = (ω − 1)
φit+1λ(Xit(τ it))Qit+1(Xit(τ it))/Mit+1(Xit(τ it))
εit+1(Xit(τ it))
(12)
As I show in Section A in the appendix, the equilibrium tariff rate for period t is ob-
tained from equation (11) such that the tariffs now include the perceived learning-by-doing
motive in addition to the political economy channel.






29Note that the government is not taking expected values over alternative values of φit+1. Instead it expects
φit+1 to be equal to φit+1 with probability 1.
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φit+1λ(φitQit)Qit+1dτ it+1 > 0 (14)
Thus, Λi measures the government perceived growth in productivity due to the LBD pro-
cess multiplied by the responsiveness of current supply to tariffs and weighted by the future
producer surplus. The tariff rate is increasing in the additional LBD term since the gov-
ernment considers the positive effect of increased production through protection today on
tomorrow’s welfare.
Let’s consider the following functional form for the LBD process30
λit+1 = λ(Xi(τ it)) = [φitQi(τ it)]
n, n < 1 (15)
Next, in order to see the effect of productivity on tariffs, we plug equation (15) in equation










Thus, assuming that φit, the part of the government perceived productivity that is inde-
pendent of the LBD process, and φit+1, its future expected value, are positively correlated
with the actual underlying determinants of TFP, the tariff rate increases in the current and
expected future productivity. This might be one of the reasons why we need to worry about
using lagged tariff rates as a way to get around the endogeneity problem while regress-
ing productivity on tariffs. More importantly, the positive effect of productivity on tariffs
30I assume λ(.) is concave. Otherwise, in the multi-period case, tariffs could be raised unboundedly which
is quite unrealistic.
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confirms the main result in my basic model in this richer setup.
Next, I also confirm that the change in tariffs is positively related to the change in
productivity as in the previous section31
d∆τ it+1
d∆φit+1
|τ it,φit > 0 (17)
We see that, introducing a government perceived LBD process adds a new channel of pro-
tection and a structure for the onset of the unilateral trade liberalization. However, the
productivity to tariff linkages, as established in the basic political economy model, prevail.
As a final note, I acknowledge that in several empirical studies, declining industries
such as textiles, clothing, footwear, and steel receive more protection in industrialized na-
tions. Therefore, these studies naturally look at developed countries and especially US
for evidence (see for example Baldwin 1985, and Marvel and Ray 1983). On the theory
side, two recent papers that build up on Grossman and Helpman (1994) are worth noting:
Baldwin (2002) uses a monopolistic competition model with sunk entry costs and random
Markov process demand shocks; whereas, Tovar (2004) introduces loss aversion in pref-
erences. One implication from these papers is that less productive sectors could receive
more protection. However, none of the models on declining industries specifically account
for unilateral liberalization or focus on establishing a link from productivity to trade policy.
The models I presented in this and previous sections intend to show this link in the presence
of unilateral liberalization which is taken to be an exogenous shock and hence used as the
working assumption to identify the effects of tariffs on productivity in the earlier literature.
Yet, the common denominator of my models and implications from these is that productiv-
ity matters for trade policy. Thus, how productivity specifically affects tariffs needs to be
tested and documented empirically as I do in the next chapter.
31Apart from the supposedly temporary nature of protection due to the infant industry argument, I assume
that in period t+ 1 the government actually realizes that the LBD process is not working. See the appendix
section A for the derivation.
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2 Productivity Matters for Trade Policy: The Evidence
2.1 Empirical Literature Overview
In this section I discuss the existing empirical literature to the extent that it relates to this
paper. Tybout (1991) briefly reviews the literature that contains implications for the link-
ages between trade and productivity, and he indicates that the net effect of a liberalization
episode is ambiguous. Therefore, a majority of the studies that appear in the last decade
remain empirical and do not test any particular theory.32,33
Nearly all researchers take a two-step approach, where they first estimate (total factor)
productivity usually at the firm level (and some at the sector level), and then regress this
productivity estimate on trade policy measures such as import penetration or tariffs for
a single country (e.g., Fernandes 2003, Schor 2004, and Tybout and Westbrook 1995).
Another strand of the literature focuses on the effect of imperfect competition in estimation
and seeks to analyze the change in price-cost margins after liberalization (Harrison 1994,
Krishna and Mitra 1998 and so on).34
Although nearly all studies neglect the endogeneity issue, Fernandes (2003) is one ex-
ception. She uses lagged tariff rates instead of current ones due to her worry with the
endogeneity problem. She also considers the variables from Trefler’s (1993) non-tariff bar-
rier (NTB) equation as instruments for tariff rates as a robustness check. Using lagged tariff
rates is not appropriate if the true model relates them in the same period. Then a better so-
32The motivation for the micro-level liberalization impact studies is based on two basic conjectures. First,
trade liberalization may produce a productivity growth for the firm and the industry through economies of
scale, improved access to foreign technology, and elimination of X-inefficiencies. Second, liberalization may
reallocate resources from the less efficient to the more efficient firms after the less efficient ones exit, hence
provide a rise in the average productivity.
33There are also ex-post theoretical studies that provide an explanation for some of the results found in the
recent empirical research. For example, in an influential paper, Melitz (2003) shows how industry productiv-
ity may grow due to reallocation between firms after an exogenous trade reform shock.
34In this paper, I focus on the single-country micro studies and relate my results directly to these. However,
there is also a related group of empirical papers where authors analyze cross-country growth regressions (as
summarized in Harrison 1996) linking openness to output growth. Such studies miss the micro variation,
which is crucial in distinguishing among various channels of productivity changes, in the data. A recent
criticism of these studies appears in Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) who are in turn criticized by Srinivasan
and Bhagwati (2001).
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lution could be to use the lagged tariff rates as an instrument to current ones. Moreover
lagged tariff rates might not get around the endogeneity problem, because trade policy
might differ across sectors due to persistent factors related to productivity. For instance,
productivity might be autocorrelated, or tariffs may be influenced by anticipated changes
in productivity as predicted by one of my theoretical results. What is more, the validity
of the instruments initially used by Trefler (1993) for a different study is debatable since
some of the instruments (like import penetration or regional concentration) could very well
be influenced by productivity, and hence be endogenous themselves.35 Muendler (2004)
is another exception in trying to control for the endogeneity of trade policy. He regresses
the growth rate of productivity on both tariffs and import penetration at the same time. He
considers certain components of the real exchange rate as instruments for the trade policy
measures.36 However, both nominal and real exchange rates lack sectoral variation and
cannot explain why tariff rates differ across sectors.37
Harrison (1994) uses time dummies for capturing trade liberalization but these do not
account for firm/industry level variation in policy. She also considers tariff changes and
import penetration in her estimations by interacting the trade policy measures with the
relevant mark-up variable. These estimations invariably suffer from the same endogeneity
problems I discussed above.
Pavcnik (2002) takes yet another approach and compares productivity changes in trad-
able versus non-tradable sectors around a trade liberalization period, finding that import
sectors experienced a larger increase in productivity relative to non-tradable sectors but
results are inconclusive for export-oriented sectors.38 This methodology does not account
35Fernandes (2003) acknowledges that these robustness results are not reliable, as some of her instruments
are clearly correlated with productivity.
36The measures are the nominal dollar exchange rate, the average sector-specific European and US-
Canadian producer price indices, and the Brazilian consumer price index. Muendler (2004) recognizes that
the domestic prices can be correlated with the productivity of firms so does not consider this as one of his
baseline instruments but rather keeps it as a component of the real exchange rate.
37Note that, I show in my theoretical model and the corresponding estimations that tariffs directly depend
on import penetration as well as import penetration depends on tariffs in a systematic way so this might
further create multicollinearity problems in Muendler’s (2004) estimations.
38Ozler and Yilmaz (2003) use the same approach to analyze the effect of trade liberalization on produc-
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for the sectoral variations in policy as well. Furthermore, Tybout (1996) notes that firms
usually self-select their trade-orientation and if more productive firms are more likely to be-
come an exporter, then one must use caution in asserting a casual relationship from policy
to performance. Pavcnik (2002) also regresses productivity on tariffs and import penetra-
tion as a robustness check, and she does not control for the endogeneity of trade policy.
In the next section, I discuss the trade policy in Colombia during the sample period of
1983 through 1998, and describe how we can rule out a uniform change in tariffs across
sectors. Then in the remaining part of this chapter, I explore more structural evidence and
make an empirical analysis based on the predictions from my theory using Colombian data
for the 1983-1998 period.
2.2 Trade Policy in Colombia
Colombia is a perfect example of a developing country that went through phases of heavy
trade protection prior to the mid-1980s and finally a dramatic unilateral trade liberalization
in the early 1990s, as can be seen in Figure 1. Therefore, it is no surprise that Colombia
has been used as the case study of several papers to examine the impact of trade reform
on productivity (for example, Roberts 1996; Fernandes 2003; Melendez, Seim and Medina
2003).
The barriers were first lowered during the 1977-1981 period in response to an increase
in coffee prices, increased foreign borrowing, and drug trafficking (Fernandes 2003). On
the other hand, the Latin American debt crisis and worsening terms of trade led to an
increase in protection in the first half of the 1980s (Edwards 2001). President Virgilio
Barco Vargas started the initial movement towards a real trade reform after he took office
in 1986. He was succeeded by President César Gaviria who completed the trade reform
swiftly in two years (1991 and 1992).39
tivity in Turkey.
39The factor markets were also liberalized during this period. For example, the labor costs are estimated
to be reduced by approximately 60% to 80% (Kugler 1999) due to the labor market reform. These additional
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I focus on protection through tariffs in my empirical estimations which directly follows
from my theory (Chapter 1) and is consistent with the productivity studies in the literature.
Note that import licenses were also commonly used in conjunction with the tariffs prior
to the trade reform. On the other hand, the trade reform not only rolled back the tariff
rates but also almost eliminated the import licenses (Edwards 2001). Thus, a reduction in
one form of protection was not replaced with another. Moreover, the tariff rates tend to
be better measured and they are positively correlated with the import licenses. However, I
also have access to the effective rate of protection (ERP) data which I use to augment my
results with tariffs. The effective rates take into account the tariffs on inputs, and they are
based on value added. They are considerably higher than nominal rates but show a similar
pattern with tariffs as can be observed from Figure 1. Amiti and Konings (2005) find that in
Indonesia, the reduction in input tariffs have a stronger positive effect on productivity gains
so it is important to address how this measure of protection also depends on productivity.
As I mentioned above, nearly all studies in the trade reform and productivity litera-
ture neglect the endogeneity of trade policy. Although some authors (e.g., Pavcnik 2002
for Chile; Ferreira and Rossi 2003 for Brazil) acknowledge the potential for endogeneity,
they argue that it may not be such an issue in their studies given that tariffs were reduced
uniformly or proportionally across sectors. This is not true at least for Colombia; the lib-
eralization was not uniform. Edwards (2001) notes that the trade liberalization reform
of Colombia (“La Apertura”) was “announced during the presidential campaign [of Ce-
sar Gaviria] as a ‘gradual’ and ‘selective’ process.” As can be observed from Figures 2
through 4, there is quite some variation in the tariff reductions across sectors.40 Moreover,
the Spearman’s rank correlations of tariffs in Table 1 indicate that the correlations reduced
over time, implying a selective process as opposed to a uniform one in liberalization. Oth-
erwise, the ranking of sectors in terms of their protection rate would not change.
reforms facilitate reallocation between firms and could potentially complement the productivity-enhancing
effects of the trade reform if anything. However, the trade reform is still the most dramatic of all, by both
Latin American and world standards (Edwards 2001).
40Note that the reductions are computed as percentages to account for the variation in the initial tariffs.
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The average advalorem tariff rates in my sample of 4-digit ISIC industries declined
from 43% in 1983 to about 14% in 1992 and stayed around that rate in the following
years (Table 2). The dispersion of tariffs across sectors also declined (Table 2). If we
just look at the standard deviations, the decline appears markedly higher. However, we
need to take into account the differences in magnitude and the coefficient of variation41 is a
better measure for that matter. The decline in dispersion is notably lower when we use the
coefficient of variation. However, this outcome does not indicate that political economy
is no more a factor in tariffs after reform. The decrease in dispersion is predicted by my
models (Chapter 1) given the fact that the liberalization occurs through the elimination of
some extra channels other than political economy.
Next, I aim to empirically show that the reduction in tariffs was a selective process due
to political economy. More particularly, I would like to test my theory which predicts that
tariffs depend on productivity, and liberalization across sectors differs based on productiv-
ity changes despite a common exogenous shock.
2.3 Econometric Model
In Chapter 1, I present two similar models of tariff policy where political economy is the
common determinant. Moreover, the government has some positive perception about using
tariffs which serves as the extra channel for protection. Both models imply protection even
in the absence of political economy. A large negative shock, which is common across
sectors, appears through these channels and serves as the source of trade liberalization.
In the estimations, I intend to capture the common features of protection and liber-
alization implied by my models. According to the political economy channel, tariffs are
inversely related to import penetration (that is Imports/Domestic Production) and import
demand elasticity. Recall that the production function is denoted as Xit = AitQit where
Ait stands for total factor productivity (TFP) and we have the following definition: In-
41Coefficient of variation is the mean divided by the standard deviation of a given group.
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verse Import Penetration/Import Demand Elasticity= AitQit/Mit
εit
. The additional source of
tariff protection causes a major unilateral liberalization when it vanishes. This occurs after
the paradigm changes as discussed in Section 1.1, or after learning-by-doing is realized to
be a false perception as in Section ??. I model the additional channels of protection under
both models with a combination of overall and sector specific constants. Then, the trade
reform that occurs due to the disappearance of such motives is a shift in the intercept terms
(constants) of the tariff determination rule. Given the parsimonious nature of the models,
the sector-specific effects also help to control for the other determinants of tariffs that may
not be already considered.
As illustrated in Figure 1, tariffs in Colombia declined drastically starting in 1990 and
liberalization continued until 1992. Based on the theory, I first start out by assuming that
liberalization is a major, once and for all shift in tariffs and relax this assumption after-
wards. I capture the shift with a dummy variable, UNILIBt, that takes the value one
for 1990 and onwards, and zero otherwise. The basic econometric model42 can then be
expressed as
log τ it = α+ β1 log(Qit/Mitεit) + β2 logAit + β3UNILIBt + µiβ4 + uit (18)
where τ it is the advalorem tariff rate for sector i = 1, ..., N at period t = 1, ..., T . Note that
the effect of Ait (TFP) on tariffs is taken in isolation with the use of logarithms. Qit/Mitεit,
together with Ait, are measures of the main political economy channel.43 µi is a 1×(N−1)
vector of industry dummy variables and depicts sector-specific effects. UNILIBt serves
as an intercept-shifter with the interpretation I described above. According to the theory,
we expect positive estimates of β1 and β2. On the other hand, the estimate of β3 should be
naturally negative by definition (it is a unilateral liberalization).44
42I am assuming no autocorrelation in the error terms, and no spatial correlation between the sectors but
heteroskedasticity which I test and confirm in the next section.
43Qit is not directly observable but it is estimated by dividing Xit by the estimate of Ait.
44α, β1, β2, and β3 are scalars, whereas β4 is an (N − 1)× 1 vector of coefficients.
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In my theory outlined in Chapter 1, the liberalization shock results in a one time perma-
nent decline in tariffs although it is not necessarily how a real reform progresses. By look-
ing at Figure 1, we can distinguish three periods with plausibly different intercept terms:
1983-1989 (pre-reform), 1990-1992 (reform), and 1993-1998 (post-reform). What is more,
there exists considerable variation within the pre-reform and reform periods.45 Therefore, I
estimate two different versions of equation (18). In the first version, I replace β3UNILIBt
with ρ1REFt + ρ2POSTREFt, where REFt is a dummy variable which equals one for
1990-1992 and zero otherwise. Similarly, POSTREFt is equal to one for 1993-1998 and
zero otherwise.46 Both control for the shift in tariffs in their respective periods relative to
the constant term, α. In the second version, I replace β3UNILIBt with θtγ where θt is a
1× (T −1) vector of year dummies that capture the yearly common variation in tariffs and
further relaxes the assumption of a one time overall tariff reduction.47
Next, to eliminate the fixed effects, I use a first-differenced model based on the basic
equation (18)
∆ log τ it = β1∆ log(Qit/Mitεit) + β2∆ logAit + β3∆UNILIBt + vit (19)
where the error term is vit = ∆uit and it is essentially autocorrelated so I correct for au-
tocorrelation in my estimations. Given the definition of UNILIBt, ∆UNILIBt becomes
just a year dummy for 1990. This may not be adequate to capture the action in the actual
data. When we take first differences, the differenced data for 1983, 1985, and 1988 au-
tomatically gets dropped given the gaps in the sample. Moreover, the trade liberalization
took place gradually between 1990 and 1992. I consider this downward trend in the reform
years by employing a different version of equation (19), where I replace β3∆UNILIBt
with ϕREFt. REFt is a dummy variable for 1990-1992 as above, and ϕ is a scalar. I
45Tariffs actually increase between 1982 and 1984 and then start to decline in 1985. The sample, on the
other hand, only includes 1983, 1985, and 1988-1990 for the pre-reform era. Between 1983 and 1988 the
trend for tariffs is a gradual decline within the sample.
46ρ1 and ρ2 are scalars.
47γ is a (T − 1)× 1 vector of coefficients.
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also estimate this modified version of equation (19) with a constant term to account for the
small tariff changes before and after the reform period where the interpretation of REFt
becomes the deviation from the constant term.
There are potentially endogeneity problems in the estimation. First, Qit/Mitεit is en-
dogenous with respect to tariffs since it depends on domestic prices, hence on tariffs. Sec-
ond, previous empirical work documented that trade policy affects productivity which re-
quires accounting for a potential reverse causation. I use the following list of instruments
to deal with the endogeneity issues: capital to output ratio, materials prices, a measure of
scale economies (value added/number of firms), and the TFP of the upstream industries.48
Instruments should be correlated with the endogenous regressors and yet be orthogonal to
the error term. I present the formal tests of instrument validity in Section 2.6 but I would
like to provide some intuition here. Capital share is expected to be negatively related to
output/imports ratio (Qit/Mit) given that Colombia is more likely to produce products with
smaller capital content and import those rich in capital based on a comparative advantage
argument. The materials prices affect the domestic output prices, hence Qit/Mitεit but not
the tariffs of a given sector i, conditional on Qit, Mit, and εit. Scale is positively correlated
with productivity and it is an inherent characteristic of a sector. The productivity of a sector
is also expected to be affected from the embodied upstream productivity which is likely to
be independent of the sector’s own tariffs.
Since the model is quite parsimonious, it is also prone to an omitted variable bias. The
use of fixed industry effects in equation (18) and its different versions, and the first dif-
ferencing in equation (19) and its different versions should alleviate this potential problem
along with the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation.
Finally, note that my productivity measure is a generated regressor as noted below. This
could potentially create measurement error and affect the efficiency and consistency of the
estimate for the effect of productivity on tariffs. However, Pagan (1984) notes that when
48The detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix section B.2.
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generated residual levels are used in a two-step regression framework, the estimates will
be consistent and efficient. Thus, this measurement error is abated in my work, since the
productivity estimates are the estimated residuals from Eslava et al. (2004) which I use in
a two-step efficient GMM estimation.
In the rest of this chapter I present and discuss the data, results, and robustness of my
estimations. Then in Section 2.7, I test how accounting for the endogeneity of tariffs with
respect to productivity affects the regressions that analyze the impact of trade reform on
productivity.
2.4 Data
The base data for the estimations span 1982 through 1998 but given the lack of tariff and
production information for certain years the sample reduces to 1983, 1985, and 1988-1998.
The tariff and effective rate of protection (ERP) figures are obtained from DNP (National
Planning Department) of Colombia at the 8-digit product level,49 which are then aggre-
gated to the 4-digit ISIC sectors by using simple averages.50 The 4-digit ISIC level import
data come from the COMTRADE dataset, United Nations Statistics Division and the in-
dustry production data at the same level are available through UNIDO’s Industrial Statistics
Database.
Productivity estimates51, value added, inputs, and materials prices data are obtained
from Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2004), where each variable (except value
added52) is aggregated from the firm level to the 4-digit ISIC industry level with production
shares used as weights. The main data source for Eslava et al. (2004) is the Colombian
49The product classification code, called “Nabandina”, is due to the Andean Community of Nations. I
thank Marcela Eslava at Universidad de Los Andes/CEDE, Colombia for generously sharing the data.
50I use simple averages to be consistent with the earlier literature. An alternative way would be to use the
import or production shares of each product as weights but these data do not exist for all sample years at this
level of disaggregation.
51I consider total factor productivity in line with the literature and I am trying to address endogeneity in
the context of these productivity studies.
52Value added is used to compute a measure of scale economies where it is an unweighted total in each
sector.
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Annual Manufacturers Survey (AMS) by DANE (National Statistical Institute). I discuss
further details about the productivity estimates below in Section 2.4.1.
The import demand elasticity measure is based on the structural estimates in Kee, Nicita
and Olarreaga (2004), which I combine with the GDP data from World Development In-
dicators (WDI), and import data from COMTRADE. The import demand elasticities are
available only at the 3-digit ISIC level.53
In order to obtain the TFP measure of the upstream industries, I employ the input-
output tables provided at the 3-digit ISIC level by Nicita and Olarreaga (2001), which were
compiled from version 4 of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database. Excluding
the inputs being used from the own sector, the upstream measure is based on a combination
of TFPs of the remaining input sectors as weighted by their share of usage.
The variable definitions and sources are presented more in detail in the appendix section
B.2. In Table 4, I provide the summary statistics for all the variables I use in the estimations.
2.4.1 Productivity Estimates
The productivity estimates come from Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2004).
Eslava et al. (2004) estimate total factor productivity (TFP) as the residual from the fol-
lowing production function for each firm i = 1, ..., N and period t = 1982, ..., 1998
logXit = b1 logKit + b2 logLit + b3 logEit + b4 log Iit + logAit (20)
where Kit, Lit, Eit, and Iit denote capital, labor (total employment hours), energy con-
sumption, and materials, respectively. An important concern in such an estimation is the
simultaneity bias; that is, productivity shocks may be correlated with the inputs. They cor-
rect for this bias by considering a measure of downstream demand as an instrument for
inputs along with regional government expenditures and input prices.
A great advantage of the Eslava et al. (2004) dataset is that it involves plant level input
53See the appendix section B.1 for a discussion on how the import demand elasticity is computed.
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prices which have not been available to other researchers in the field requiring them to use
non-parametric estimation techniques instead of the structural estimation of the production
functions.54 Furthermore, output measures commonly used in the literature have usually
been the firm revenue deflated by the industry-level prices. Thus, within-industry price
differences (e.g. due to different markups) have been part of the output and productivity
estimates of such studies, potentially biasing their results.
2.5 Estimation Results
Before we move on to the results, let us first observe the simple correlations of total factor
productivity and tariffs. The overall correlation coefficient for logAit and log τ it in the
whole sample of 920 observations is -0.222. This is significant at the 1% level and can be
observed graphically in Figure 5 as well. In Table 3, I present the correlation matrix for all
combinations of logAit and log τ it across years. The two variables again have a relatively
small negative correlation for the most part which is insignificant for certain years such as
1992 through 1994. These relationships also appear in Figure 6 which includes plots of
TFP versus tariffs by year. In Table 3, it is interesting to note that the two variables can be
concurrently and also intertemporally correlated. This is one reason why using lagged tariff
rates may not get around the endogeneity problem of tariffs with respect to productivity.
Topalova (2004) notes a similar pattern in the Indian data for the 1997-2001 period and
excludes this period from her analysis due to her concern about endogeneity.
However, we cannot establish a causal relationship between tariff protection and pro-
ductivity with these crude observations alone. We need to control for the other important
variables as required by the theory and tackle the endogeneity issues. In this section, I
show how productivity influences tariffs after I control for the endogeneity of productivity.
Later in Section 2.7, I estimate a system of equations related to this setup and show that
54The methodology in these studies was developed by Olley and Pakes (1996), and advanced by Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003). They employ investment or intermediate inputs to control for the correlation between input
levels and unobserved firm-level productivity shocks.
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accounting for the effect of productivity on tariffs strengthens the positive impact of trade
reform on productivity.
As noted in Section 2.3, the two right-hand-side variables–inverse import penetration
to import demand elasticity ratio, and total factor produtivity–in the tariff regressions are
potentially endogenous which I confirm in the next section. I use instrumental variables to
address this problem. More specifically, I employ the two-step efficient generalized method
of moments (henceforth IV-GMM) estimator with either fixed effects or first differences for
my unbalanced panel. This methodology is more efficient than regular instrumental vari-
ables in the presence of heteroskedasdicity of unknown form due to its use of an optimal
weighting matrix (Cragg 1983). A Pagan-Hall (1983) test confirms the presence of het-
eroskedasdicity in the data and further justifies the use of IV-GMM methodology.
In Table 5, I present the main estimation results. In column 1, we have the estimates for
equation (18). As predicted by theory, tariff rates depend positively on the inverse import
penetration to import demand elasticity ratio (Qit/Mitεit) and positively on total factor
productivity (Ait). The coefficients for the two main variables, β1 and β2, are positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level. The unilateral liberalization variable, UNILIBt,
takes out the common reduction in tariffs after 1990, and it is significant and negative as
expected. In column 2, I provide the estimates for the fist variant of equation (18). Here,
we take into account the variation in data by dividing it into three periods as opposed to
imposing a one time major decline in tariffs. The two intercept-shifters, REFt (period
dummy for 1990-1992) and POSTREFt (period dummy for 1993-1998), control for the
common decline in tariffs across sectors relative to the 1983-1989 period and come out
negative and significant. Thus, the results are in line with the ones in column 1. In column
3, we have the estimates for the second variant of equation (18) that allows for further
variation across time with the year effects and captures the gradual decline in tariffs. Both
β1 and β2 are still positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in columns 2 and 3.
The year dummies in column 3 are jointly significant just like the industry fixed effects are
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in all three equations.
A positive coefficient on Qit/Mitεit, such that tariffs are inversely related to import
penetration and import demand elasticity is a result consistent with the previous findings
in the empirical political economy literature (such as Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000
for the US, Mitra et al. 2002 for Turkey, and Karacaovali and Limão 2005a for the EU).
A positive coefficient for Ait, that is more productive sectors receive higher tariff protec-
tion, complements this result and confirms my major theoretical prediction. This result is
also important because none of the earlier researchers separate the size effect into Ait and
Qit. Moreover, I account for the exogenous unilateral liberalization shock common across
sectors in all specifications so there is no doubt that political economy does matter for the
sectoral variation in tariffs. Therefore, endogeneity of tariffs with respect to productivity is
a prevailing problem when researchers plainly regress tariffs on productivity.
In Table 6, I provide the estimates of equation (18) and its variants that measure the
effect of yearly productivity changes on tariff changes with the first differenced data. The
methodology is still IV-GMM and I employ the first differences of each instrument from
Table 5. The sample now reduces to 1988-1998 given the gaps in data. In column 1, β1
and β2 have the expected signs but are not significant. This result is not surprising given
that ∆UNILIBt fails to recognize the gradual decline in tariffs and acts as a single year
effect for 1990. I correct for this by estimating equation (18) and replacing ∆UNILIBt
with a common term for the 1990-1992 period (REFt) during which the liberalization took
place step by step (column 2). In this version, β1 becomes significant at the 10% level and
β2 at the 5%. REFt has a negative and significant (at the 1% level) coefficient capturing
the common downward trend. In column 3, I further allow for a common constant term
on top of REFt recognizing the small changes in other years, and both β1 and β2 become
significant at the 5% level. These results indicate that due to political economy, the extent
of liberalization is smaller for sectors that have a smaller reduction or higher increase in
productivity as compared to similar sectors. Note that in all differenced results, β1 and β2
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are statistically identical, which is predicted by the model. In levels, this may not occur
because of fixed effects.
Although the theoretical section involves protection through tariffs, I repeat the spec-
ifications in Table 5 and Table 6 with effective rates of protection (ERP) in order to see
whether the results hold with a different measure of protection. Effective rates are based
on value added and essentially take into account the effect of tariffs on inputs as well. ERP
data are provided by the National Planning Department of Colombia (DNP) and I am lim-
ited by their computations since I do not have the detailed data to calculate them myself.
As can be observed from Figure 1, and Table 4 the effective rates are higher than the regular
tariff rates but otherwise display a similar trend. I exclude the three sectors55 that exhibit
negative ERP (in levels not logs), because it is hard to argue that these sectors are indeed
protected. In Table 7, I repeat the specifications from Table 5 and the results appear to be
totally consistent. The only difference is that the significance levels for the main variables
are lower, and the constant term becomes insignificant in columns 2 and 3. The same argu-
ments apply to the figures in Table 8 which are the replicas of estimates from Table 6 with
ERP. The results are again qualitatively similar but less significant.
In the next section, I provide specification tests and some sensitiviy analysis for the
main estimations I covered. Then, in Section 2.7, I discuss how accounting for the endo-
geneity of tariff policy, as implied by my theoretical and empirical results, may improve
the estimates of the effect of trade reform on productivity.
2.6 Robustness and Specification Tests
In Table 9, I examine the effect of past productivity on current tariffs to check whether
policy implementation occurs with a one period lag although it is not part of the model. I
employ one period lags of scale and upstream TFP as instruments for the lag of productivity,
55The excluded sectors are: a) ISIC 3122, manufacture of prepared animal feeds; b) ISIC 3512, manufac-
ture of fertilizers and pesticides; c) ISIC 3822, manufacture of agricultural machinery and equipment.
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and hence repeat the specifications in Table 5 with logAit−1 instead of logAit. I find
that more productivity yesterday calls for more protection today in all three specifications.
However, precaution is required while interpreting this result since it might be picking up
the persistence in tariffs as well.
In tables 10 and 11, I present the biased ordinary least squares (OLS) results for com-
parison. In Table 10, I provide the estimates of equation (18), and in Table 11 the estimates
of equation (19) with OLS using both tariffs and effective rates of protection. The OLS
coefficients have the same signs as the IV-GMM estimates but they are smaller. In addition
to that, log(Qit/Mitεit) and ∆ log(Qit/Mitεit) have significant coefficients in all specifica-
tions while the coefficients for logAit and ∆ logAit are insignificant in all except the one
for ∆ logAit in Table 11, column 2.
I confirm the endogeneity of log(Qit/Mitεit) and logAit econometrically through a
Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test, which further justifies the use of instrumental vari-
ables instead of OLS. Furthermore, the Hansen-Sargan (Hansen 1982 and Sargan 1958) test
of overidentifying restrictions indicate that the instruments are valid, that is they are uncor-
related with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equations.56 The
probability value for the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid, range from 0.144 to
0.933 for the main specifications presented in Table 5. The Hansen-Sargan test probability
values are presented in the last row of each relevant table and they have high values, as
desired, for the estimations in first differences (Table 6) as well. The Hansen-Sargan tests
fail for the ERP specifications in levels (Table 7) but not in differences (Table 8). Given the
endogeneity and good performance with tariffs, it is prudent to keep these instruments and
ensure comparability with the tariff results.
In Table 12, I report the first stage regressions for the main tariff specification in Table
5, column 1, where we see that all the instruments are jointly significant and the regressions
have a high explanatory power. I also find that the results are not driven by any specific
56Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic, which is the minimized value of the GMM criterion function
(Hansen’s J), is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions.
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instrument which I check by excluding each one at a time.57 In Table 13, we have the first
stage regressions for the main first-differenced specification (Table 6, column 1) which are
not as strong as the ones in Table 12 in terms of the explanatory power but all instruments
are still jointly significant. The partial R-squared values based on Shea (1997) indicate that
the instruments for logAit explain a substantial fraction of its variation. The same is not
true for log(Qit/Mitεit) and the first-differenced equations.
Figure 1 indicates that in Colombia the major trade liberalization era started in 1990 and
continued until 1992 where new persistently lower levels of tariffs were reached. Given the
restrictiveness of UNILIBt by construction, I allowed it to take 1991 instead of 1990 as
the cutoff point as well and the results remain robust to this different cutoff value. Further-
more, when UNILIBt is excluded, the coefficient magnitudes rise but the results carry
through.
2.7 Endogeneity Bias and the Effect of Tariffs on Productivity
The theoretical and empirical results I presented in the earlier sections indicate that we
should be worried about the endogeneity of trade policy with respect to productivity. If the
researchers do not account for the endogeneity, their estimates of the trade policy effects
on productivity will be biased. However, it is hard to tell the direction and magnitude of
the endogeneity bias unless the system is very simple.58 Once we have other regressors in
the system, the correlations among them do not permit us to make any predictions about
the bias. Therefore, I illustrate how the bias might be working with a system of equations
57Including labor share as an additional instrument also does not change the results qualitatively but lowers
the probability value of the Hansen-Sargan test.
58Suppose that we have the following two equations that relate tariffs and productivity: (1) logAit =
a1 + a2 log τ it + w1it and (2) log τ it = b1 + b2 logAit + w2it where w1it and w2it are mean zero error
terms with constant variances σ2w1 and σ
2
w2 . Then assuming that the covariance between the two error terms
is zero, i.e. cov(w1it, w2it) = 0, we obtain cov(w1it, log τ it) = b21−b2a2σ
2
w1 . If the true values of a2 and b2
are such that a2 < 0 and b2 > 0, then we have cov(w1it, log τ it) > 0. If we estimate a2 with OLS, ignoring




In constructing this system, I partly rely on the setup of my estimations in the previous
section. On the other hand, I do not have a structural equation showing how productivity
depends on tariffs so I just try to keep it similar to the estimations in the earlier empirical
literature. I model the tariff and inverse import penetration equations as before and add a
third equation for productivity as follows
logAit = α1 + α2 log τ it + (logZ1it)α3 + µ1iα4 + Z2tα5 + υ1it (21a)
log τ it = β1 + β2 logAit + β3 log(
Qit
Mitεit
) + µ2iβ4 + θtβ5 + υ2it (21b)
log(Qit/Mitεit) = γ1 + γ2 log τ it + (logZ3it)γ3 + υ3it (21c)
where υ1it, υ2it, and υ3it are the error terms for sector i = 1, ..., N at period t = 1, ..., T .
µ1i and µ2i are 1 × (N − 1) vectors of industry dummies, and θt is a 1 × (T − 1) vector
of year dummies. Z1it and Z3it are 1 × 2 vectors of control variables at the 4-digit ISIC
sector level, whereas Z2t is a 1 × 2 vector of economy-wide controls.59 Z1it includes the
scale measure and upstream TFP, whereas Z3it includes capital to output ratio and materials
prices. Note that these industry level control variables are precisely the instruments I used
in the instrumental variables estimations above so they are expected to be exogenous. The
other advantage of these controls is that I get a consistent framework with the rest of my
estimations. Z2t includes GDP growth and inflation to control for the macro changes in the
economy that might affect the productivity in all sectors.
My estimates of equation (21a) are at the 4-digit industry level. This limitation pre-
cludes any direct comparison between my estimates and the ones in the recent firm-level
studies. However, after I estimate the system with three-stage least squares (3SLS), I com-
pare these results with the simple OLS estimates of equation (21a) that ignore endogeneity
and get the chance to test whether accounting for endogeneity improves the results within
59Note that α1, α2, β1, β2, β3, γ1, and γ2 are scalars. α3, α5, and γ3 are 2×1, α4 and β4 are (N −1)×1
vectors, and β5 is a (T − 1)× 1 vector.
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my dataset.
In Table 14, I provide the comparative results of estimating the whole system with
3SLS and estimating equation (21a) with OLS only. As in line with the earlier literature,
a negative OLS estimate of the coefficient for tariffs in equation (21a), i.e. bα2 < 0, indi-
cates that productivity is inversely related to tariffs. The 3SLS regression results not only
confirm this finding but also show that the positive effect of lower tariffs on productivity
grows slightly stronger (by 1.5%) when I account for the endogeneity of tariffs. The 3SLS
results from equation (21b) are similar to the findings I present in Table 5: more productive
sectors receive higher protection, and tariffs are inversely related to import penetration and
import demand elasticity. In Table 15, I replicate the estimations from Table 14 by using
effective rates of protection instead of tariffs and find identical results. However, this time
the positive impact of liberalization on productivity is larger by 17% when we estimate the
whole system. These findings indicate that the trade policy effects on productivity might
be underestimated when endogeneity is not accounted for.
2.8 Final Remarks
In chapters 1 and 2, I have shown, both theoretically and empirically, that we should be
concerned about the endogeneity of trade policy with respect to productivity. This has
been neglected for the most part in the recent empirical literature. Studies that investigate
the effect of trade policy on productivity often argue that the exogeneity of the trade liberal-
ization shock helps to identify a linkage without worrying too much about the endogeneity
of tariffs or other forms of trade policy. I account for such an argument in my theoretical
and empirical models, and still obtain tariffs to be endogenous.
The main result from my theoretical models, simple yet compelling, is that despite an
exogenous unilateral trade liberalization shock that is common across sectors, we obtain
a differentiated effect across sectoral protection based on productivity. Based on my the-
ory, I predict that more productive sectors receive more protection and that the extent of
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liberalization is less for sectors that experience a higher productivity increase.
Next, I test and confirm these theoretical results using production, trade, and tariff data
at the 4-digit ISIC industry level for Colombia between 1983 and 1998. I keep all of
my estimations closely related to my theory and account for all the potential endogeneity
problems by using relevant instruments and methodologies.
Finally, I estimate a system of equations and show that by not accounting for the en-
dogeneity of trade policy with respect to productivity, we might underestimate the positive
impact of trade reform on productivity. Thus, correcting for the endogeneity bias does not
overturn the results in the early empirical literature but makes them somewhat stronger for
Colombia which would be interesting to test for different countries as well.
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3 The Clash of Liberalizations: Preferential vs. Multilat-
eral Trade Liberalization in the European Union
Most of the early theory analyzing the effects of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on
multilateral trade liberalization (MTL) assumed that MTL implied free trade. Therefore,
the research focused on how PTAs affect the binary choice between free trade and no MTL
and it effectively asked whether PTAs made a multilateral trade round more or less likely.60
Assuming that a round leads to free trade and focusing on its probability simplifies the
analysis but generates predictions that are nearly impossible to test because these rounds
are so infrequent. Moreover, countries can choose to conclude a multilateral round with
considerable liberalization or one with nearly none. Thus, the focus should be on whether
PTAs affect the change in multilateral tariffs as we do below and not simply the probability
of a round.61 Before we present the theory and the empirical results, we first briefly discuss
the trade policy in the European Union in the next section.
3.1 The European Union’s Trade Policy
Before the expansion in 2004, the EU’s membership was composed of 15 countries that ac-
counted for one third of the world output and more than 20 percent of world trade. The EU
succeeded the European Communities that started in the 1950s as a customs union. Cur-
rently, its members form a single market with free movement of goods, services, capital,
and labor. There is also a very strong element of cooperation in non-trade policies, partic-
60Krishna (1998) argues that PTAs reduce the likelihood of a multilateral round because the export rents
generated by PTAs disappear when countries liberalize multilaterally and so the producers that benefit from
those rents will oppose MTL. Levy (1997) shows that the median voter may reject multilateral free trade after
voting for a PTA even though she would have accepted it, if no PTA had been available.
61Bagwell and Staiger (1998b) analyze two opposing effects of PTAs on the equilibrium multilateral tariff
level in a self-enforcing model. They show that PTAs are a stumbling block if countries are very patient
and a building block otherwise. Another approach to the PTA vs. MTL issue is due to Krugman (1991)
who analyzes the welfare path for exogenously expanding trading blocs, which Bond and Syropoulos (1996)
also analyze. Winters (1999) surveys this literature. Several articles in the July 1998 issue of the Economic
Journal address various aspects of the regionalism vs. multilateralism issue, see for example Bagwell and
Staiger (1998a).
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ularly in issues with regional spillovers such as immigration, environment, development of
poorer regions, foreign policy, and judicial matters.
The key actors in the formation of EU trade policy are the European Commission and
the Council. The Commission proposes, negotiates and enforces trade policy on behalf of
the members. The Council, where each member’s government is represented, is the deci-
sion maker with the power to approve or reject the Commission’s proposals for trade policy
negotiations and their eventual outcome. That is, the Council is decisive in approving the
common external tariff that the Commission negotiates in multilateral trade rounds as well
as any preferential treatment it negotiates with non-EU members.62
The EU’s expansion of preferential trade treatment has occurred both through increased
membership—initially 6 and currently 25 countries–and through numerous PTAs with
non-members. In the appendix, we provide some details about the latter (including their
abbreviations)–here we note only a few key points. First, several of the EU’s PTAs do not
require the partner to lower their tariffs. Second, many of these PTAs, e.g. preferences to
developing countries through GSP and ACP, seek, and at times explicitly require, coop-
eration in non-trade issues such as labor standards, human rights, migration control, and
combat against drugs. The PTAs with the Mediterranean countries are also similar in na-
ture and historically established ties aimed at addressing issues with regional externalities,
such as immigration, matter.63 These features are explicitly captured by our model. Several
of the countries that benefit from these preferential treatment fear that MTL on the part of
the EU will erode these preferences. Thus, they have at times opposed to MTL but the EU
62After 1987 the Commission gained greater control and the veto power of individual countries in the
Council was replaced with qualified majority voting. Consequently, some interest groups have also started
lobbying the Commission directly However, even after 1987, industry associations continued to favor lobby-
ing their own government as opposed to the Commission. (Hayes 1993). Thus, our assumption in section ??
that lobbying works through governments is a reasonable one. The European Parliament is regularly informed
on trade policy by the Commission and is also involved by giving “assent” on major treaty ratifications that
cover more than trade. For details see <http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/index en.htm>
63According to Jackson (1997, p.160) “during the last twenty-five years or so the experience of the GSP
in the GATT system has been that ... the industrialized countries often succumb to the temptation to use the
preference systems as part of ‘bargaining chips’ of diplomacy.” The conditionality of EU’s concessions in
exchange for cooperation has further been documented for instance in Grilli (1997).
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itself has used the same argument to avoid liberalizing, which is central to our model.64
In the estimation we also consider the remaining preferences the EU had in place be-
fore the Uruguay Round (UR): to EFTA members that did not eventually join the EU and
to some Central and East European economies. These did involve reciprocal trade prefer-
ences. However, the East European countries had to comply with several side conditions,
e.g. environmental regulations. For the EU, the benefits of these side conditions along
with the political integration in Western Europe likely outweighed the preferential treat-
ment provided to the EU exports.65 A similar argument applies to the accession of Greece,
Spain and Portugal to the EU. So our model will focus on this exchange of preferences on
the part of the EU for cooperation in non-trade issues, appropriately modified in the cases
of accessions where a common external tariff is applied.
3.2 Theory
In this section, we show how PTAs can induce higher MFN tariffs and derive the structural
equations that we estimate. The model captures the key features of the EU’s PTAs previ-
ously described by extending Limão (2002) along several important dimensions. First, we
model a political economy motive for the use of tariffs, which is an important determinant
of the cross-sectional tariff structure. Second, we allow for a more general trading pattern
and, more importantly, for different types of PTAs. The PTAs we consider differ on whether
they involve a common external tariff and allow for direct cash transfers across members,
which enables us to test alternative important hypotheses relevant for the different types of
agreements signed by the EU.
An important advantage of the model we develop is that it provides a rich set of testable
predictions about the effect of PTAs that are signed with even small countries. The model
64For example, in 2000 the European Commission argued that a cut in the price support of about 25
percent in EU sugar was not tenable because it would cause an income loss of 250 million euros to ACP
countries, some of whom export sugar to the EU under preferential treatment. European Commission (2000),
“Commission Proposes Overhaul of Sugar Market,” Brussels, October 4th 2000, IP/00/1109.
65See Winters (1993) for details on the EU’s Eastern European programs.
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points to a stumbling block effect of the PTAs on the multilateral tariffs of the large country
when nontrade issues matter between the large and the small partner, as in the case of
the EU with the ACP countries. However, the prediction also extends to more general
agreements when nontrade issues may not be as important, for example in the FTA between
the EU and the EFTA countries. When the preferential agreement is valued by the PTA
members, reducing the multilateral tariffs is costly since it erodes the preferential margins
and the viability of the agreement which is valuable.
3.2.1 Model
Each of the two symmetric regional blocs we model is composed of two economies, L (a
large country) and S (a small country). We normalize labor units such that each of the H
individuals in each country is endowed with one unit of labor–the only factor of production.
We assume that both countries have the same population to ensure that L places a non-
negligible weight on those issues proportional to S’s population, e.g. on human and labor
rights or immigration and environmental issues. The numeraire good is produced with
labor according to a constant returns to scale production process. We normalize the price
of the numeraire to one, which is identical in all countries.
Individuals in L (and similarly in L∗) have a quasilinear utility function,





where Ψ(.) represents the subutility function for the public good.66 Ψ(.) is concave in
both the local public good provision, E, and the provision by S, Es, due to a regional
spillover.67 We can interpret E broadly as public expenditures to address environmental
problems, enforce human and labor rights and immigration laws, etc.
In L, some individuals are endowed with Xi units of at most one of the non-numeraire
66Note that due to quasilinearity we have ci = di(pi) = u0i(pi)−1 or u0i(.) = pi.
67Limão (2002) shows that the main results extend to the case where the spillovers are global.
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goods indexed by i. Thus, there are 2I+1 types of individuals indexed by their endowment
where the “extra” individual type is not endowed with any good, just labor. The population
is sufficiently large so that the numeraire good is always produced in equilibrium, which
fixes the wage at unity–labor’s marginal revenue productivity in the numeraire sector.
For given prices and taxes, an individual of type i chooses the quantities of the private
goods she consumes to maximize her utility subject to a budget constraint, c0+
P
i pici ≤ y.
Given the assumptions on the subutility, the budget constraint is satisfied with equality and
all individuals demand the same quantity of each of the non-numeraire goods, di(pi) =
u0i(pi)
−1. Thus the indirect utility of an individual of type i is




where υi(.)68 represents the consumer surplus. An individual’s income sources are the
wage, the value of the endowment and net taxes. Net taxes are equal to per capita tariff
revenue, TR/H, net of the tax used to finance the public good, e.
The government sets its trade policy and supplies the public good in order to maximize
a political support function which we define below in equation (26). The public good is
produced using he units of labor according to E = bhe. Given that the wage rate is fixed
at unity, the balanced budget condition implies that the amount of public good produced in
equilibrium is E = bHe.69 Therefore, the income for individual i ∈ [1, 2I] in L is
y = 1 + piXi + TR/H − e (24)
We label the goods in increasing order of L’s endowment–from i = 1 to 2I . Denoting
68Due to the quasilinear utility function of the individuals, the consumer surplus for the non-numerarire
goods can be expressed as υi(pi) = ui(ci) − pici. Throughout the text we focus on a quadratic form of the
subutility, ui(ci) = (aci − c2i /2)/b, where a and b are constants. This gives rise to linear demand curves,
di(pi) = ci = a− bpi, and implies that υi(pi) = (a− bpi)2 /2b. Moreover, the aggregate demand is simply
Di(pi) = Hdi(pi).
69The tariff revenue is distributed lump-sum and we assume that none is used to finance the public good,
which maintains the two policies within L separable in the analysis that follows.
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the variables for the other regional bloc with an “*”, the “mirror” symmetry assumption
implies that the endowment of L∗ is biggest for i = 1. Thus, L imports i ∈ [1, I] from L∗
and exports i ∈ [I + 1, 2I]. We assume that all H individuals in S are identical and that
S is endowed with Xsi of i ∈ [1, s] where s ≤ I.70 Aggregate demand in S is Dsi < Xsi
for i ∈ [1, s], and it is fixed and positive up to some price level p̄i and zero otherwise.
Hence S exports i ∈ [1, s] in exchange for the numeraire.71 To simplify exposition we
focus on the case where net exports from S are price inelastic and thus the main effect
of the preference is an income transfer from L to S in the form of higher export prices.
However, the qualitative results are similar if we relax this elasticity assumption, as we
show in Karacaovali and Limão (2005a).72
Country L sets specific tariffs τ i on the imports from L∗ and a preferential tariff πi ≤ τ i




i (pi − τ i) +M si = 0 for i ∈ [1, I] (25)
where Mi(.) ≡ D(pi)−Xi, M∗i (.) ≡ D∗(pi− τ i)−X∗i and M si ≡ Dsi −Xsi are the import
demand functions for L,L∗ and S respectively (i ∈ [1, s] for S). Since export subsidies
are generally not permitted by the WTO, we abstract from them. Thus, the domestic price
in L∗ of a good it exports is simply the price in L net of the tariff, pi − τ i. A similar
market clearing condition holds for goods i ∈ [I+1, 2I] imported by L∗. These conditions
implicitly define the domestic prices in L and L∗ as functions of the tariffs–pi(τ i) for i ∈
[1, I] and p∗i (τ ∗i ) for i ∈ [I+1, 2I]. Note that because the net export supply functions of the
70One possible justification for employing a representative agent and not modeling a motivation for S to
impose tariffs is that the trade policy of the countries that we consider as PTA partners for the EU often has a
negligible effect on the issue that we will address.
71Symmetrically, S∗ exports i ∈ [2I − s, 2I].
72For some of the agreements that we analyze, assuming that the changes in trade flows between L and
S do not drive L’s trade policy is not only analytically convenient but also plausible, since the additional
exports from a small partner to the EU are unlikely to amount to a large share of the EU’s total imports. In
our data those values for 1994 were 13% for the GSP, 5% for EFTX, 2.7% for MED, and 1.4 % for CEC.
GSPL and ACP account for less than 0.5 %.
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small countries are price inelastic, the equilibrium prices pi and p∗i are not directly affected
by the preferential tariffs. It is then simple to show that an increase in τ i raises pi, whereas
an increase in τ ∗i lowers the price for L’s exporters.73
In the absence of export subsidies the only trade taxes set by L∗ that affect L are its
tariffs and we can think of the import sectors in each country as the only ones potentially
“favored” by the governments. Since we also assume that any individual endowed with a
non-numeraire good represents a negligible share of the population, it is reasonable to focus
on a case where those individuals lobby their respective governments only for policies in
their own sector. Therefore, the government in L sets the trade policy to maximize the
following political support function which is a weighted sum of the social welfare
G(τ ,π, τ ∗, e, es) ≡ H
Ã




















As described above, 1 − e represents the wage income net of the per capita tax used to
finance the provision of a public good in L, which is valued according to the subutility
Ψ(e, es).74 The consumer surplus is υi(.) and TR(.) represents the tariff revenue, which
we specify in the appendix section C.1.75 The last two terms of G(.) represent a weighted
value of endowments, where ωi ≥ 1. If ωi = 1 for all i, the objective reduces to a standard
social welfare function. Therefore (ωi−1) represents the additional weight the government
places on individuals endowed with an import good.76
An important issue that arises when we apply the model to the EU is whether equation
73By implicitly differentiating equation (25), we find that ∂pi(τ i)/∂τ i ∈ (0, 1) and ∂pi(τ∗i )/∂τ∗i ∈
(−1, 0). The balance of payments condition is satisfied through movements of the numeraire good.
74We can express Ψ(.) in terms of e and es given that E = bHe (hence Es = bHes).
75The tariff revenue is distributed lump-sum and we assume that none is used to finance the public good,
which maintains the two policies within Large separable.
76This is a reduced form that can be obtained as a special case from a model where lobbying is given
micro-foundations, such as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), provided that in that model the ownership of
the specific factors is concentrated.
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(26) represents the objective of an individual government or a joint objective, as maximized
by an EU-wide institution. In Karacaovali and Limão (2005a) we show that equation (26)
can be obtained as the objective for the EU that arises from bargaining between independent
EU-member governments–a fair representation of the EU’s trade policy formation, as we
described in Section ??. The weight in equation (26) can then be interpreted as an average






i , where ξ
k
i is the production share of the
EU member k in i. This point will also be important in the empirical section because it will
provide us with the correct way of aggregating the data for the member countries.77
3.2.2 Preferential vs. Multilateral Trade Liberalization
MFN Tariffs in the Absence of Preferences We first derive the MFN tariff rate that
results when PTAs are not allowed.78 This benchmark tariff plays an important role in the
empirical estimation because, as we show, it is also the equilibrium rate for the subset of
products in which S either does not export or receive any preferences even when PTAs are
already pursued. This subset of goods will be our control group in the estimation.
Following Bagwell and Staiger (1999), we model the main motive for reciprocal trade
liberalization in the WTO as a cooperative outcome between countries that gain from over-
coming a terms-of-trade externality. Accordingly, most of the negotiations occur between
large countries and follow what is known as the principal supplier rule: if, for a given
product, country L is the largest exporter to L∗, then L∗ proposes a tariff reduction to L
on that product in exchange for L’s tariff reduction on L∗’s exports to L. The MFN rule
77To obtain equation (26) as the EU objective we assume: (1) identical preferences across union members;
(2) no trading costs within the union so the same prices hold for all; (3) different populations and endowments
are allowed provided that the set of import sectors (broadly defined) is identical and so import taxes are chosen
on similar industries; (4) the Council chooses EU trade policies and e to maximize total surplus ΣcGc(.) and
then bargains over any bilateral transfers; (5) numeraire transfers are possible across members and subject to
bargaining; (6) the regional good financed by the EU is valued by each individual in its totality. Note that
there is an interesting question of which is the optimal country in the union to decide on the common tariff
(Syropoulos 2002), which we do not address because in the EU this decision is better captured by assumption
4 above.
78This will also be the equilibrium rate if L does not want to pursue a PTA, e.g. if it did not value the
regional public good.
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then requires this reduction to be extended to all other WTO exporters of similar goods.
Given that both the EU and the rest of the world are several times larger than most of the
EU’s individual PTA partners we take L and L∗ as the principal suppliers. In the estimation
section we relax this assumption.
In the absence of PTAs, L andL∗ choose their multilateral tariffs to maximize their joint
objective. Given the symmetry between them, it is sufficient to focus on one and, since the
problem is stationary, we can concentrate on maximizing L’s objective within each period.
Thus, after imposing the symmetry condition that tariffs in the respective import sectors




{G(τ ∗ = τ ,π, es = 0, .) : π = τ} (27)
where the constraint precludes preferential tariffs, i.e. π = τ . For simplicity, throughout
our analysis we abstract from potential enforcement problems between L and L∗ in setting
multilateral tariffs by assuming they are sufficiently patient such that the incentive compat-
ibility constraints for MTL do not bind.80 Given the additive separability of the effect of
different goods on the objective function in equation (26) and the symmetry across regional
blocs, the tariff for good i is independent of L’s MFN tariffs in other goods. Therefore, the
expression for the MFN tariff below–derived in the appendix section C.1–applies to any
good that is not subject to a preference, i.e. whenever τ i = πi, and whether PTAs are
allowed or not.81 We derive the advalorem equivalent of tariffs as they are the focus of our
empirical work, i.e. tmi = τmi /p∗i , which, according to the first-order-condition (FOC) of
79The tariff vectors are respectively τ ∗ = (τ∗2I , τ∗2I−1, ..., τ∗I+1) and τ = (τ1, τ2, ..., τ I).
80The incentive compatibility problem arises because countries have market power in trade and thus an in-
centive to cheat and increase their tariffs. For a detailed analysis of the issues that arise when these constraints
do bind, see Limão (2002).
81Symmetry across countries allows us to focus on reciprocity across pairs of symmetric goods. In general,
reciprocity occurs across sets of goods, which we will take into account in the estimation.
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the program above, is equal to











The import demand elasticity for L is denoted by εi, whereas the foreign export supply
elasticity it faces is ε∗i .82 If good i is not exported by the regional partner, i.e. if M si = 0,
this expression is similar to several political economy models (Helpman 1997). The tariff
is increasing on the political economy weight, ωi, and the inverse of the import penetration
ratio, Xi/Mi. This value is further weighted by the import demand elasticity for standard
Ramsey taxation reasons.83 The last term represents an MFN externality effect and leads to
higher tariffs. It arises if S does not participate in MTL directly because the MFN clause
requires L and L∗ to lower their tariffs on imports from all partners even if some did not
reciprocally lower their own tariffs. This effect disappears either if L has no market power
in good i, 1/ε∗i = 0, or the share of S in L’s total imports of i is negligible.
MFN Tariffs in the Presence of Preferences We first model how the preferential tariff
is chosen and then determine its effect on multilateral tariffs. The PTA between L and
S is characterized by a bargaining solution where L grants preferential tariffs, π ≤ τ ,
in exchange for an increase in S’s provision of the regional public good. To capture the
asymmetry in size and bargaining power between the EU and its PTA partners we allow
L to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to S. In a one-shot interaction both countries have
an incentive to cheat but cooperation can be sustained through repeated interaction. This
implies that L’s offer extracts as much of the bargaining surplus as possible up to the point
where S’s incentive compatibility constraint is just binding.





i ] × [p∗i /(M∗i +Msi )]. Note that import demand elasticities are typically estimated with
respect to the domestic price but we define it slightly differently for the purpose of the model discussion and
derivations. However, our empirical implementation will take this into account explicitly. See Section C.2
for details.
83The more inelastic the import demand, the lower the deadweight loss from import taxes, i.e. tariffs.
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Since we did not model a trade policy motivation for S, the “political support” function
it maximizes is identical to its total welfare: labor income net of taxes, endowment value
and consumer surplus.
Gs(π, τ ,es) ≡ H(1− es) +
s≤IX
i=1
[(pi(τ i)− πi)Xsi + (p̄i − psdi )Dsi ] (29)
where psdi = pi(τ i) − τ i is the consumption price in S and, for simplicity, we focus on
the extreme case where it places no weight on the activity that is valued by L, so it simply
enters as a cost, Hes.
The incentive compatible level of es is obtained by requiring the current gain to S from
deviating, i.e. setting es = 0, not to exceed the foregone gains from cooperation due to
the PTA. The equilibrium condition for es under a PTA with no CET is obtained from
Gs(π, τ , es = 0)−Gs(π, τ , es) ≤ [δ/(1− δ)]× [Gs(π, τ , es)−Gs(π = τ , τ , es = 0)],
where δ ∈ (0, 1) represents S’s discount factor and we use the fact that τ will be the threat
level of the tariff used by L if S stops cooperating.84 When S is a WTO member, the
highest credible threat tariff that L can use is to revert to the MFN tariffs, τ , as required by
the WTO rules. Then, using equation (29) and assuming for simplicity that S exports only
good 1, we obtain the equilibrium bargaining level of es for a given preferential margin,
τ 1 − π1, as
eb = δ(τ 1 − π1)Xs1/H (30)
The amount of tax that S collects to supply the regional public good is proportional to
the revenue transfer from L due to the preference. Given the additive separability of the
objective function in equation (26), the tariffs for goods other than i = 1 are specified by
84The MFN tariffs are set on the assumption that S accepts a PTA and will not deviate. Moreover, if it
does, L removes the preferences and sets its tariffs equal to τ , the multilateral tariffs originally agreed upon
with L∗. That is, we assume that after a deviation by S, L and L∗ do not renegotiate their MFN tariffs.
An alternative is to assume that after a deviation by S the MFN tariffs implemented are changed to τm.
This introduces some changes but similar qualitative results can be obtained regarding the stumbling block
effect. In practice, we think our assumption is more realistic since there are costs to re-adjusting MFN tariffs
between rounds which may lead governments not to do so.
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equation (28). The MFN constraint is now relaxed, π ≤ τ , and the preferential tariff is
optimally chosen taking into account the fact that it will affect eb. Hence, the equilibrium
MFN and preferential tariffs are given by
{τmp, πp} ≡ argmax
τ,π
{G(τ ∗ = τ ,π, es, .) : π ≤ τ ; es = eb} (31)




















To compare this with the tariff if PTAs were forbidden, tmi , we take their difference and
evaluate at tmi . This yields a non-negative term that captures the potential for a stumbling
block effect of a PTA:





]ti=tmi ≥ 0 (33)
To interpret and sign this term, we first note that 1/Mip0iεi is positive, so the sign depends
on (δGes/H − 1)Xsi . From equation (30) we obtain ∂eb/∂τ i = −∂eb/∂πi = δXsi /H and
from equation (26) we have Gπ = Xsi . Therefore, (δGes/H−1)Xsi = −(Gπ+Ges∂eb/∂π).
The last expression is simply the first order condition for πi, which is positive if the optimal
preferential tariff rate, πpi , is zero at τmi . That is, if we are at a corner solution in the PTA,
where L would like an increase in es but cannot lower π further because it is already at
zero. In this case L has an incentive to increase the MFN tariff above τmi .86
The intuition for the stumbling block effect is straightforward. When the marginal
benefit of S increasing es is higher for L than the cost in terms of the foregone tariff
revenue, L would prefer to increase the preferential margin given to S and it initially does
85See the appendix section C.1 for this derivation.
86A sufficient condition for a corner solution in the PTA is for L to place sufficient weight on S’s provision
of the regional good.
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this by reducing the preferential tariff. However, once the preferential tariff is at zero, the
preferential margin can only be increased by raising the MFN tariff.87
Common External Tariff and Direct Transfers for Cooperation Most results on PTAs
depend on whether they have a CET.88 Given that between the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds–
the period we analyze in the empirical work–the EU expanded to include new members that
share its CET, we analyze the effect of such accessions on MTL.
The use of a CET raises the practical issue of how the tariff revenue is to be distributed
over the different countries, e.g. if all goods enter the EU via one port, does that country
receive all the revenue? This requires PTAs with a CET to agree to revenue transfer mecha-
nisms. Therefore, one key difference relative to other PTAs is the existence of a mechanism
for transfers, which L can use to “purchase” the supply of the regional good. We note that
the willingness to implement such transfer schemes is often limited, which along with the
need to agree on a CET, explains why customs unions are rare relative to PTAs with no
CET. The implicit costs in the use of direct transfers explain why we ruled them out in
deriving the stumbling block effect in the absence of a CET.89 However, those countries
that can agree to a CET clearly do not face prohibitive costs of direct transfers since they
use them to redistribute revenue. So the PTA solution must now explicitly allow transfers.
87The observed preferential tariffs in the real world are everywhere bound at zero, which explains why we
model them in this way. However, there is no conceptual motive why they can’t be negative, i.e. subsidies.
Limão and Olarreaga (2005) estimate that switching to import subsidies would generate considerable welfare
gains by allowing additional MTL on the part of the EU, US and Japan. They also discuss solutions to
potential implementation problems that may explain why these subsidies have not yet been used.
88Cadot et al. (1999) argue that “deepening integration is likely to work toward reinforcing protection-
ist pressures against nonmembers” (p. 651) when there is a CET but not necessarily if the PTA has no
CET in place. Bagwell and Staiger (1998b) indicate that in the absence of a CET, PTAs would undermine
reciprocity and non-discrimination, the main pillars of the multilateral trading system. However, they also
show that PTAs with a CET could still be efficient in terms of reciprocity as long as external tariffs are
non-discriminatory.
89Using direct transfers may also not be the most efficient way to transfer resources to other countries, as
the aid vs. trade literature highlights, or reward cooperation since the direct transfer may end up in the pockets
of a politician without providing the best incentives for cooperation. For example, one of the stated aims of
the U.S. in providing preferences to the Andean countries is to raise the relative price to activities other
than drug production. Political economy constraints that reduce the effectiveness of direct transfers relative
to preferences are present in practice, otherwise we would not observe several of the current preference
schemes.
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As we show in the appendix section C.1, the stumbling block effect disappears under
this case. However, despite the ability to use transfers, a preferential rate may still be used
because, for given multilateral tariffs, L is indifferent between a transfer and preferential
tariff reductions. At a given MFN tariff, the cost for L of a reduction in π is simply the
lost tariff revenue, which is no more costly than transferring an equivalent amount in the
numeraire good. The difference relative to the PTA without a CET is that now if, at π = 0,
S is still not providing “enough” es, the optimal solution is for L to increase the transfer
rather than the MFN tariff, since the latter distorts the prices. Thus, in equilibrium we have
τmcu = τm.
3.3 Estimation
3.3.1 Predictions and Identification
We now derive the model’s estimating equation, point out its main predictions and analyze
how it is identified. Combining the expression for the MFN tariff rate in a good with
preferences (equation (32)) and the one without preferences (equation (28)), we obtain the
following:
















where Ii is an indicator for whether good i is imported from a preferential partner and









and dropping the product subscripts, we have the econometric model in error
form
t = φI + βx+m+ u (35)






|x,m, I) and β = E((ωi−1)|x,m, I).






|x,m, I) > 0
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and so φ is positive if and only if δGes/H > 1, which we showed to be the condition for
a stumbling block effect to exist. Therefore, the key question is whether φ is positive. We
also test two other important predictions that, because they are specific to this model, may
lend it support. The first one is that φ = 0 for products with a positive preferential tariff.
The second one is that the MFN tariff should be equal between non-PTA goods and goods
exported by countries that recently joined the EU and have access to transfers.
The theoretical model captures the key features of trade policy determination. However,
it is parsimonious and possibly not fully specified, e.g. tariffs tend to be highly persistent,
which may be due to an unobserved product effect. Such an effect may also influence
whether a good receives a preference and generate an omitted variable bias. We address
this by estimating the model in changes rather than levels.90 However, this still allows us
to estimate the level of the stumbling block effect, as will become clear. Since the model
focuses on MFN tariffs, which the EU changes very infrequently, we take the change as
the difference between the MFN tariffs negotiated in the UR and those in place before it,
which were largely set during the Tokyo Round.91 Then, the change for a good i that was
not imported under a zero preferential tariff before the Tokyo Round but became so by the
time the Uruguay Round was negotiated is
∆t = φI + β∆x+∆m+∆u (36)
Note that we assume the weights, ωi, are time-invariant.92 We also use the fact that for a
good i that was not imported under a zero preferential tariff before the Tokyo Round we
90Considering changes over two multilateral rounds in the empirical work is not inconsistent with the
theoretical model. Even though the theoretical model features no expected changes in protection after MTL
occurs and PTAs are agreed, it does allow for unexpected changes. That is if in a period the production
to import ratio or political weights fall, then the equilibrium MFN tariff also falls according to the model.
Moreover, although we abstracted from them, once we allow the incentive compatibility constraints of the
countries negotiating MTL to bind, then shocks to their discount factors would also change the equilibrium
level of MFN tariffs.
91Although in theory the EU could have renegotiated specific tariff lines between rounds, the WTO shows
no record of such renegotiation between the Tokyo and Uruguay rounds.
92In Karacaovali and Limão (2005a) we relax this assumption, test it and find that it is reasonable.
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have Iit−1 = 0 and if it became a PTA good before the conclusion of the UR, then Iit = 1.
To confirm that the underlying parameters in the change equation can be interpreted exactly
as the ones in equation (35) when Iit−1 = 0 and Iit = 1, note that in terms of the underlying






Iit + (ωi − 1)∆xi +∆mi. For goods






] + (ωi − 1)∆xi +∆mi.
Thus, for PTA goods from agreements that were in place before the Tokyo Round, e.g. for
certain GSP and ACP goods, the coefficient on Ii measures any increase in the marginal
benefit to the EU from the provision of the regional public good between the two rounds. In
Figure 7, we illustrate how our approach identifies the level of the stumbling block effect
in the model and thus provides an estimate for what the tariff in the PTA goods would
have been in the absence of a PTA. The tariff increase up to the dashed line indicates the
stumbling block effect predicted by the model if the preference is duty-free (i.e. tmp− tm).
We plot the tariffs for two goods that are similar except that one becomes a PTA good
between the Tokyo and UR. The tariff increase up to the dashed line indicates the stumbling
block effect predicted by the model if the preference is duty-free. The EU may choose not
to change the bound tariff immediately because this would impose a renegotiation cost (as
well as the costs from higher tariffs on EU products that other countries would be allowed
to set) but, when the new round occurs, the difference in the reduction in the two products
reflects the stumbling block effect93 (once we condition on the other variables).94
93Note that tm − tm0 is the change in MFN tariffs for a non-PTA good between the two periods; whereas
tm − tmp0 is the change for a “new” PTA good. The difference between these two differences gives us the
stumbling block effect, i.e. (tm − tm0)− (tm − tmp0) = tmp0 − tm0 = φ.
94An alternative explanation for the EU waiting until the UR before changing the MFN tariff is that the
initial, higher, MFN tariff may generate a sufficiently large preferential margin so that a zero preferential
tariff is not used. This was true of several of the EU’s programs before the UR. The reduction of MFN tariffs
in the UR however reduces the preferential margin, thus generating the stumbling block effect. In fact the EU
did reduce many of its preferential tariffs after the UR precisely for this reason. This can also explain why
the stumbling block effect interpretation in equation (36) applies even to products that were already imported
under a preference during the Tokyo Round since if the preferential tariff was positive then Iit−1 = 0. For
instance, the preferences have been expanded through a number of revisions for MED, ACP, GSP, EFTX,
which are the agreements that initially took effect before the Tokyo Round. These revisions also included
new requirements on cooperation relating to human rights and democracy from all recipients (Brown 2002,
Raya 1999). In addition to that, the European Economic Area with EFTA in 1992 provided a much deeper
economic integration between partners.
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One important determinant that is not explicitly reflected in equation (36) is reciprocity–
the extent to which the EU lowered its tariffs in response to other countries’ reductions
in the UR. Reciprocity is an important principle in WTO negotiations and a basic fea-
ture of our theoretical model; it is not fully reflected in equation (36) because we as-
sumed symmetry across the regional blocs and then solved for the equilibrium tariff ex-
pression. By relaxing this assumption and controlling explicitly for reciprocity we mini-
mize the possibility for omitted variable bias and can be more confident that the estimated
PTA effect, φ, captures the structural effect predicted by the model.95 We follow Limão
(2006) who constructs a measure of market access “concessions” that is consistent with the













jt] where ∆tkj/tkjt is the percentage tariff reduction by a non-EU
country k in good j and wkjt is the import share of good j in total imports of k. Therefore
the term in brackets captures country k’s average market access concession, which is mul-
tiplied by skit–the export share of a principal supplier k to the EU as a share of total exports
from all of the EU’s principal suppliers.96 The prediction is that if k offers relatively larger
concessions then the EU reciprocates through larger MFN tariff reductions in the products
it imports from k.
The final issue in deriving the estimating equation is data availability. We do not have a
bilateral record of which countries negotiated with the EU on each specific 8-digit product
during the trade rounds and therefore we can’t construct the exact MFN-externality vari-
able, ∆m. But we proxy for it by using information on the share of small exporters by
product, i.e. the share of those countries that are not one of the top-5 exporters in product
i to the EU. Increases in this share between the rounds imply that the probability of an
MFN-externality increases, since the EU would have to negotiate with more exporters each
95One concern if we did not account for reciprocity is that products exported by PTA partners tend to have
fewer non-PTA members trying to extract tariff reductions from the EU. Although this could reasonably be
described as an indirect stumbling block effect, in the sense that it works through reciprocity, it is not the
direct effect that we are trying to estimate. By controlling for reciprocity separately this indirect effect is not
reflected in the estimated φ.
96We consider an exporter to be a principal supplier of good i if it is one of the top 5 exporters of good i.
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of whom now has a higher incentive to free-ride. We consider the change in this share
between 1994 and 1989, the earliest year when the 8-digit harmonized standard data is re-
ported. If the change in this period is sufficiently large then it will be positively correlated
with the change over the full period between rounds. We attempt to capture this by con-
structing an indicator variable, P , for whether the change in this share for good i is above
the median change.97 The model then predicts a positive coefficient on this variable.
Introducing the proxy for ∆m and augmenting equation (36) to explicitly account for
reciprocity yields our basic estimating equation:
∆t = c+ φI + β∆x+ ρR+ µP + v (37)
where we include a constant term, c, which does not have a structural interpretation.98 We
also modify the error to explicitly allow for any measurement error due to the proxy and
reciprocity variables. Even if we were to rely strictly on the orthogonality conditions im-
posed by the theory we would have to address new components in the error. Since we are
interested in establishing causality, we now discuss how we address the potential endogene-
ity issues in estimating equation (37) for which we confirm the existence of endogeneity in
Section 3.3.5.
The preference may depend on MFN tariff changes, e.g. if a PTA partner expects a
small MFN reduction in a product, it is more likely to request a preference in it than in a
product where it expects a large MFN reduction. To tackle this source of reverse causation,
and also the potential bias from using a proxy for the MFN externality variable, we employ
instrumental variables. The main instrument for I is another indicator, which is equal to
one when a product is imported by the EU from the PTA partner in 1994 regardless of
97Although our approach here is mainly driven by the lack of data we note that focusing on the changes in
the years leading up to the round has the advantage that they are likely driven by factors other than the EU’s
subsequent MTL. The estimation results do not change when we employ 75th or 90th percentiles instead.
98If we extended the model to either provide a unilateral motive for the EU’s tariff reduction or explic-
itly analyze the role of increased patience in its MTL incentive constraints we could provide a structural
interpretation for the common term.
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whether it receives a preference or not. This instrument is correlated with I , that is whether
a product both receives a preference and is imported duty-free from the preferential partner
but we expect it to be uncorrelated with the error term since the changes in the MFN tariff
we use as a dependent variable are implemented starting only in 1995. The second main
instrument for I is whether the good was subject to a non-tariff barrier (NTB) set by the EU
in 1993 on all countries. A country is more likely to seek a preference in a good if it expects
that otherwise it would certainly be subject to an NTB. This effect would be magnified if
the country already exports this product, hence we interact this variable with the export
indicator as well. Moreover, we will be able to test and verify the exogeneity of the export
indicator and NTB variables as instruments because we employ a GMM approach. The set
of over-identifying restrictions that allows us to perform these tests arise from including
other instruments, such as world price changes between 1992 and 1994, that help to predict
if a good was exported in 1994 but are unlikely to depend on the changes in MFN tariffs
that take place in the subsequent years.
The variable that captures the political economy effect, ∆x, is likely to depend on the
MFN tariffs since it involves the production/import ratio weighted by the import demand
elasticity, all of which are functions of the EU’s domestic prices and hence its MFN tariffs.
Therefore, we employ the levels of these variables before the MFN tariff is implemented,
e.g. 1978 for xt−1 and 1992 for xt. We find some evidence of endogeneity99 and therefore
instrument ∆x with the change in a measure of scale economies (Value added/number
of firms) and its interaction with the average world price change in the industry between
1992 and 1994, which are tested for orthogonality to the error term.100 All else equal,
economies of scale is likely to be positively correlated with the inverse import penetration
ratio (X/M), yet be independent of tariffs. World prices, on the other hand, directly affect
domestic prices which are important determinants of all the components of x, i.e. X, M ,
99As we discuss in Section 3.3.5 the Hausman test of endogeneity indicates this evidence.
100As we discuss and explain in Section 3.3.2, x is constructed using industry level data. Thus, β can be
interpreted as the average EU-wide extra weight taken over different industries rather than products.
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and ε but do not depend on the tariff rates that are set subsequently.
Finally, the reciprocity variable is another potential source of endogeneity due to re-
verse causation since the total tariff reduction by other WTO members in the UR partially
depends on EU reductions. We instrument for reciprocity by using the unilateral portion of
the total tariff reductions that are eventually offered at the UR. More specifically, several
countries undertook unilateral trade liberalizations between 1986 and 1992. They were
unilateral because they were undertaken outside of GATT negotiations, without an expec-
tation that they would be reciprocated since the very completion of the round was itself
in doubt until 1992. However, when the final multilateral cuts were negotiated, between
1992 and 1994, the unilateral reductions undertaken from 1986 to 1992 were explicitly re-
ciprocated because they had taken place after the official start date of the round (Finger et
al. 1999). Therefore, we employ the unilateral liberalization by WTO members between
1986 and 1992 as an instrument for what eventually was used as a basis for their reciprocal
liberalization–the amount between 1986 and 1995.
3.3.2 Data
In the appendix section C.2 we provide detailed data definitions and sources, and in Table
20 we have the summary statistics for all the variables used in the estimations. Here we
note some of its salient characteristics. We employ the advalorem MFN tariffs from the
WTO schedules of concessions101, and the preferential tariffs from UNCTAD, both at the
8-digit HS level.102 To construct the reciprocity variable we employ the data in Finger
et al. (1999). They use the available tariff reductions for each WTO member during the
101These refer to bound rates but we find that the applied and bound rates are equal for about 99% of the
products for the EU in our sample, hence we do not expect this to bias our results.
102The model requires using preferences for the post-UR period, hence we employ the preferential rates
reported for 1996 for all PTAs except for EFTA, which was only reported in 1993. Moreover, we exclude
products with a zero MFN tariff before the Uruguay Round for two reasons. First, when the MFN tariff
is zero there is often more noise in the data about whether a preference exists or not, since it is in effect
irrelevant. Second, all the tariffs in the sample that were initially zero remained unchanged and are likely to
share an unobserved common characteristic. Thus, including those observations would bias the estimates if
the proportion of zero tariffs is different for PTA goods relative to the rest of the goods.
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UR, and aggregate it from the product level into country-averages. We take these average
country concessions and construct a product specific measure of reciprocity by using top 5
suppliers’ export shares (from Eurostat) to the EU by 8-digit product.
We use data on production and other industry-level variables for constructing x and its
instruments. This data is available for individual EU members and we aggregate it exactly
as suggested by the theoretical model.103 UNIDO’s industrial database provides the most
comprehensive source covering all EU members and dating back to 1978. It is collected
at the industry level and hence more aggregated than the trade and tariff data. We use
clustering at the industry level to correct the standard errors for the fact that it is more
aggregated than tariffs and trade.104 Since UNIDO does not provide production data for
agriculture we exclude those products, but processed agricultural products are included.105
In Table 16, we present the tariff levels and their changes for our sample. Although
our analysis is conducted at the product level we provide some statistics here aggregated
by industry. The highest tariff rates before and after the UR appear in the tobacco sector
(SIC-314): an average of 42 and 25 percent respectively. The lowest pre-UR tariffs are in
the miscellaneous petroleum and coal products sector (SIC-354) with 3.9 percent, whereas
the iron and steel industry (SIC-371) become the least protected in terms of tariffs after
the UR, 0.4 percent. The footwear sector (SIC-324) experienced the least liberalization,
0.8 percentage points, and tobacco the highest, 17. Note also that there is a considerable
103In terms of production this entails simply adding it up over the EU members. The interpretation of the




i − 1)ξci where ωci is the individual
member weight for a given producer and ξci is the production share in the EU.
104In calculating the variable (XI/MI)/εI the remaining variables that we employ are at the same level
of aggregation as the production data. The fact that this data is more aggregated could potentially introduce
some measurement error. Although we can not rule out this possibility, we note that it may not be such an
important concern for the following reason. If the EU negotiators use the data at the most disaggregated level
available for most of its members, as we do, then our measure is actually the relevant one. The interpretation
of β is now as the average EU-wide extra weight taken over the different industries rather than products. We
are comfortable with this interpretation, since producers tend to organize at the industry level to lobby for
protection. This is particularly true in the EU, where there is more variation in protection across industries
than within them. Therefore, to the extent that the extra weight reflects a political economy motive, the best
way to identify it is at the industry level.
105Given the prevalence of non-tariff barriers and EU subsidies in agriculture we don’t believe this is a
drawback since an analysis that focuses on tariffs without taking these other forms of protection into account
could be inappropriate for agriculture.
59
amount of variation in tariff changes both within industries, with coefficients of variation
between 0.28 and 1.5, and across industries, with a coefficient of variation of 0.44.
3.3.3 Estimation Results
The unconditional mean reduction in MFN tariffs by the EU was 4.4 percentage points for
non-PTA products but only 2.9 for PTA products during the UR. A simple t-test confirms
that the difference of 1.5 percentage points, with a standard error of 0.1, is statistically
significant. This difference may be due to other factors that are correlated with the PTA
variable. Therefore, in Table 17 we present the estimates of the parameters in equation
(37). In order to address the endogeneity issues discussed above we employ an instrumen-
tal variables (IV) technique. More specifically, we use the two-step efficient generalized
method of moments estimator (IV-GMM), which is robust to heteroskedasticity with an
undetermined form and cluster at the industry level, for the motive we describe above. In
Section 3.3.5, we discuss the formal tests of endogeneity and heteroskedasticity that justify
this procedure.
Stumbling Block Estimates The indicator variable Iany0 in Table 17 takes the value one
if the EU imports the good from any partner at a duty-free preferential rate. It excludes
countries that acceded after the Tokyo Round, which we estimate separately as suggested
by the theory. The coefficient for Iany0 provides an estimate of φ and we find that it is posi-
tive and significant at the 1 percent level under all specifications. This provides evidence of
a smaller reduction in the EU’s MFN tariffs for its PTA products (with a zero preferential
tariff) relative to its non-PTA products as predicted by the model. Before quantifying the
importance of this stumbling block effect, we test other predictions.106
106A potential cost of using data that is finely disaggregated is that it is more likely to suffer from product
misclassification when a shipment is recorded. We try to minimize this problem by classifying a good as
being exported by a PTA to the EU only if the value registered in that year is above a certain low threshold.
In our estimations, we employ the 5th percentile of the value of a given PTAs’ exports in that year as the
threshold. In Section 3.3.5, we test and find that this does not affect our results .
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Although we did not explicitly model simultaneous PTAs we expect that in such an
extension if a product is exported by several preferential partners, then a given increase in
the margin of preference benefits more than one of these partners and generates a stronger
stumbling block effect. We test this in column 2 of Table 17-Panel A by including an
additional variable, Ievy0, which is an indicator for whether the EU imports the product at
a tariff of zero from every preferential partner. We find that the stumbling block effect for
this subset of products is indeed larger.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 17-Panel A, we present the OLS results for the main
specifications for comparison. The coefficients on Iany0 and Ievy0 are similar but smaller
and statistically significant at 1 percent. In Section 3.3.5, we compare the IV results to
those obtained using OLS more in detail.
A prediction from our model is that the stumbling block effect is only present for prod-
ucts with a zero preferential tariff. We test this in column 1 of Table 17-Panel B where the
variable Iany takes the value one for the goods imported by the EU at a preferential tar-
iff rate–either zero or positive–whereas Ipos is one for the subset of goods with a positive
preferential tariff, which account for about 1.5 percent of the observations in the sample.
The total effect of a good with a positive preferential tariff is obtained by summing the two
coefficients and doing so, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the tariff reduction for such
goods is identical to the non-PTA products. This prediction is fairly specific to the model
and thus its confirmation provides it strong support.
According to the model MFN tariff changes for products imported from countries that
joined the EU between the last two trade rounds should be identical to those of other prod-
ucts, if transfers are offered as part of the accession to the EU. We find this to be true in
the data. In column 2 of Table 17-Panel B Iafs and Ispg are indicator variables for products
exported by Austria, Finland, and Sweden and Portugal, Spain, and Greece respectively,
which are statistically insignificant. The stumbling block effect generated by the PTAs that
do not share a common external tariff with the EU remains unchanged both in magnitude
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and significance.
The model also predicts the stumbling block effect to be stronger in products that are
important exports for a PTA partner, as we can see from the fact that in equation (34) the
stumbling block effect is multiplied by the level of exports from the PTA partner, Xsit. We
test this by introducing an additional variable, Ihi exp–the interaction of Iany0 with Dhi exp,
where Dhi exp is one if the share of a PTA partner’s exports in good i relative to its total
exports to the EU is above a certain threshold. In column 3 of Table 17-Panel B we estimate
that such an extra effect is present and significant.107
The estimates presented so far refer to an average effect of all of the EU’s PTAs, which
is arguably closer to our theory that features a single PTA. However, it is useful to quantify
whether the effect is driven by any given PTA in particular, e.g. such estimates are an im-
portant input for determining the welfare effects of eliminating specific PTAs, as in Limão
and Olarreaga (2005). Moreover, for some PTAs we have Iit−1 = 1 = Iit and for others
we do not and we would like to see the separate effects of each. Although there is a posi-
tive correlation among the variables for the different programs, we do identify a stumbling
block effect originating from each in column 4 of Table 17-Panel B. All individual effects
are significant with the exception of the one for the ACP, which is nonetheless significant
when tested jointly with the GSP, a program with preferences highly correlated with those
in ACP.
In Table 18, we present the first stage regressions for some of the main specifications,
which indicate that the instruments are jointly significant in all of our specifications. More-
over, the row at the bottom of Table 17 (both Panel A and Panel B) labeled as “Hansen’s
J” shows that the excluded instruments pass the orthogonality tests as a group. When the
set of instruments is large this test may have low power. Therefore, we also test the subset
107The level of exports is the appropriate variable even if we estimate the equation in changes provided
that Iit−1 = 0. We do not use a continuous measure of the level of exports because it is more likely to be
determined by the preferential tariff rates whereas the indicator is more likely to capture exporter motives for
specialization in some products. In Table 17-Panel B, we present the case where the threshold is set at the
twenty-fifth percentile but the results are qualitatively similar if different levels such as the median or 75th
percentile are used.
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of instruments that are a priori more likely to be endogenous, such as the export dummy
and NTB variables. The results are found in the row “C-Stat” and indicate that we cannot
reject the orthogonality of the smaller subsets either.
Reciprocity and Political Economy Determinants of EU Tariffs Tariff changes are
notoriously hard to predict and in fact most empirical studies that employ a structural ap-
proach focus on explaining the cross-section. Nonetheless, given how sparse the evidence
is for the EU’s trade policy determination, we think that it is interesting to ask whether the
remaining variables of our parsimonious model have any explanatory power.
The coefficient on ∆x provides an estimate of (ω − 1), which can be interpreted as the
production weighted average of the extra importance attached to producer surplus relative
to social welfare of the EU members, as we discuss in Section ??. We find it to be positive
ranging from 0.0025 (column 4 of Table 17-Panel B) to 0.0039 (column 1 of Table 17-
Panel B).108 To our knowledge there are no such estimates for the EU, but for the US,
Goldberg and Maggi (1999) estimate this extra weight to be approximately 0.014, whereas
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) estimate a much lower value of 0.0003.109 Thus our
estimate for the EU lies in between these. In Karacaovali and Limão (2005a), we relax the
constraint of constant weights across sectors and show that industries with higher share of
employment and higher regional concentration receive higher tariff protection, however we
also find that the restriction of constant weights (over industries and time) is reasonable for
the EU.
As we point out in the introduction, reciprocity is a key variable in the theory behind
MTL but there is some disagreement about its use in practice. We find that the EU reduced
its tariffs by more in products exported by trading partners that reduced their own tariffs
by a greater amount. Note that, reciprocity may magnify the stumbling block effect, be-
108The OLS estimates for the coefficient on∆x are positive and insignificant which is not surprising given
its endogeneity (columns 3 and 4 of Table 17-Panel A).
109Goldberg and Maggi (1999) actually report 1/ω = 0.986 (p. 1145) whereas Gawande and Bandyopad-
hyay (2000) report 1/(ω − 1) (p. 147).
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cause smaller reductions in the EU will be reciprocated by smaller reductions in the trading
partners. Since Limão (2006) also finds reciprocity to be a significant factor in the US mul-
tilateral tariff reductions during the UR, we expect that the stumbling block effect of the
EU and the US had an indirect effect at least in the reciprocal tariff reductions between the
two of them.
Our proxy for the change in MFN externality term, ∆m, has the expected positive sign
(except for the specification in column 4 of Table 17-Panel B) but it is insignificant under
all specifications. One explanation for this is that the reciprocity variable already accounts
for this effect. Since those countries that free-ride will have small average tariff reductions,
the EU will “reciprocate” with smaller tariff reductions of its own as well.110
3.3.4 Quantification and Interpretation
The simplest interpretation of the coefficient on the PTA variable is that it represents how
much the MFN tariff for PTA products increased relative to the non-PTA products. Its
value is 1.5 percentage points for products exported under any PTA and about 2.2 for every
PTA. Since the reduction for non-PTA goods was 3.4 percentage points, the magnitude of
the stumbling block effect is not trivial.
We can quantify the tariff effect in terms of price changes to assess its economic im-
portance. In the context of the average price effects generated by tariff changes during the
UR, the stumbling block effect is not negligible. This is clearest from employing the ratio
of the relative price growth effects ∆ ln pdpta/∆ ln pdmfn = ∆ ln(1 + tmp)/∆ ln(1 + tm) ≈
∆tmp/∆tm = 1 + φ/c, where c is the estimated average tariff change for non-PTA prod-
ucts.111 Note that, this statistic can also be used to measure the relative world price effects
110It is also possible that our proxy is an imperfect one or that the MFN externality effect is simply negligi-
ble. Finger (1974) provides some direct evidence that countries can target concessions to minimize the MFN
externality. He reports that in the Dillon Round (1960-61), where negotiations were bilateral and item-by-
item as in the Uruguay Round, 70% of US imports of items that it agreed to reduce its tariffs in were exported
by countries with whom the concession was directly negotiated.
111This equality applies to a “benchmark” good with no changes in market access, nor in the elasticity
adjusted production/import ratio. If the stumbling block effect completely offsets the average price effect,
then 1 + φ/c = 0 and if the price effect for the PTA products were identical to the non-PTA products,
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for goods where there is imperfect pass-through, that is ∆ ln pwpta/∆ ln pwmfn ≈ 1 + φ/c
provided the pass-through rate for PTA goods is similar to other goods.112 This is impor-
tant because one key concern with PTAs is that they have an impact on other countries by
affecting the prices received by excluded countries, for example by causing higher MFN
tariffs, as our model shows.113 Moreover, there is considerable evidence of imperfect pass-
through both from exchange rate changes but also from tariff changes.114 Therefore, the
closer 1 + φ/c is to zero the stronger the stumbling block effect. For example, a value of
0.5 indicates that a non-PTA country received only half of the export price increase from
EU’s MFN tariff changes in the UR by exporting a PTA good relative to a similar non-PTA
good. An alternative interpretation in light of the theoretical model is that the export price
for the PTA goods was half of what it would have been in the absence of EU PTAs.
At the bottom of Table 17 (both Panel A and Panel B), the row labeled 1+φ/c provides
the estimates of the price effects as well as their confidence intervals. The effect of any PTA
is about 0.55 (column 1, Panel A) and it is not very sensitive to controlling for a positive
preferential tariff (column 1, Panel B) or for the exports of AFS or SGP (column 2, Panel
B). The effect for goods exported by every PTA is stronger: 0.39 (column 2, Panel A).115
An interesting question is whether our estimates carry any information about the un-
observed counterfactual of what the average EU tariff would have been in the absence of
the statistic would be equal to 1. The approximation ∆ ln(1 + tmp) ≈ ∆tmp is valid in our sample since
∆ ln(1 + tit)−∆tit for all types of products takes a value between 0 and 0.005 for 90 percent of the sample
and between 0 and 0.011 for 99 percent of the sample.
112To be more precise, since we can write the domestic price as ln pdt = ln(1 + t
prog
t ) + ln p
w
t then ζ ≡
∆ ln pdi /∆ ln(1 + t
i) = 1 +∆ ln pwi /∆ ln(1 + t
i), for i = pta, mfn. We can then write the ratio of world
price effects for PTA to non-PTA products as∆ ln pwpta/∆ ln pwmfn = [∆ ln(1+tpta)/∆ ln(1+tmfn)](ζ
pta−
1)/(ζmfn − 1) ≈ 1 + φ/c if ζpta ≈ ζ < 1.
113This concern is confirmed by Chang and Winters (2002) who find that the formation of Mercosur lowered
the prices for non-Mercosur producers exporting to them. Olarreaga et al. (1999) show that terms-of-trade
effects pose a relatively important motive in explaining Mercosur’s external tariff structure.
114Finger (1976) estimates that less than one third of the tariff reductions by the U.S., Japan and European
Community were passed on to their respective consumers during the Kennedy Round. Goldberg and Knetter
(1997) survey the extensive evidence on imperfect pass-through from exchange rates. Feenstra (1989) showed
that the effects of the exchange rate pass-through is symmetric to the effects of tariff changes in the US.
115The effect of the significant individual programs range from 0.88 (GSP) to 0.93 (EFTA, CEC) and the
combined effect of all individual programs is 0.53, smaller than the 0.39 estimated in column 2-Panel A but
not statistically so.
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any PTAs. A strict interpretation of our estimates according to the theoretical model is
that MFN tariffs are 1.5 percentage points higher for PTA products as compared to their
absence and since PTA products represent a large share of our sample, all products are up
by 1.4 percentage points. However, there has also been a considerable amount of debate on
whether the PTAs pursued by the US and the EU increased or decreased the probability of
completion of the Uruguay Round.
However, there is no consensus on this question. On the one hand the question of
stumbling blocks arose as the Uruguay Round was delayed, with some blaming it on PTAs,
and on the other hand others have argued that PTAs actually lead partners to the multilateral
table. Since multilateral trade rounds are too infrequent, whether PTAs increase or decrease
the probability of a round can not be answered econometrically. Given that we cannot
estimate this effect on the probability, and the lack of consensus on whether it is even
positive or negative, the best we can do is estimate the effects of PTAs on MFN tariffs
given that there were PTAs in place in the last round and use the model to interpret these
estimates in a way that allows us to get at the counterfactual of what would have happened
in the absence of any PTAs.
Although we cannot obtain exact econometric estimates of the effects of PTAs on the
probability of the completion of the round, we can provide some bounds for our results that
try to incorporate such effects. To do so, we first distinguish between a direct and an indirect
effect of PTAs on MTL. The direct effect of the EU’s PTAs is the one we estimated: the
higher tariffs the EU maintained on its PTA goods given how much other countries changed
their tariffs. The indirect effect refers to whether the EU’s PTAs increased the probability
of the last round and, given that the round did occur, whether those PTAs made other
countries reduce their tariffs by more or less. This effect is indirect in that it works through
reciprocity. Thus if PTAs affect the probability of a round, they alter the expected value of
the EU’s tariff changes by changing the expected value of reciprocity. Given this, consider
the expected difference in the MFN tariffs of the EU in a world with PTAs, denoted by
66
a variable z = 1, and the unobserved world without them, z = 0. The main difference
between the two is the existence of PTA goods and the extent of reciprocity.
E(∆t|z = 1, I, R,∆x)− E(∆t|z = 0, I,∆x,R, P ) = φE(I) + ρ(p1R1 − p0R0) (38)
where we assume that in the presence of PTAs if there is a direct stumbling block effect, it
will affect the average tariff independently of whether there is a round and that the unilateral
motives for changing the tariffs are identical whether there are PTAs or not. When a round
is not completed, the EU does not reciprocate other countries’ tariff changes. Thus, we
have ρ = 0 with probability 1 − p1 when there are PTAs and with probability 1 − p0
when there are no PTAs. Therefore, the second term reflects the difference in the expected
reciprocity effect on the EU’s tariffs depending on the existence of PTAs. The most neutral
case to assume is that the existence of PTAs affects neither the probability of a round,
p1 = p0, nor the amount of tariff reductions undertaken by other countries given that a
round is completed, R1 = R0. In this case the reciprocity term in equation (38) is zero and
we obtain the average value of 1.4 percentage points discussed above.116
To provide some bounds on the results that account for possible effects of PTAs on the
probabilities of MTL, suppose that in the absence of PTAs the UR would not have been
completed, p0 = 0, and the mere existence of PTAs assured its completion, p1 = 1. In this
case the total stumbling block effect is 0.014+0.006(-0.46)≡1.1 percentage points, where
ρ =0.006 from Table 17 and R1 = −0.46 from Table 20. So even under this extreme as-
sumption, PTAs are a stumbling block and would have been so unless the average reduction
in tariffs by other countries, as represented by R1, had been almost 6 times larger than what
we actually observed. If, on the other hand, p0 = 1 and the probability of completing the
round under those PTAs was nearly 0, then the total stumbling block effect is at least 1.4
percentage points. Although we did not observe the realization of R0, we can reasonably
116To obtain equation (38) we use equation (37) to write E(∆t|z = 1, I,∆x,R,P ) = p1(φI + β∆x +
ρR1+µP + v)+ (1− p1)(φI +β∆x+µP + v) and E(∆t|z = 0, I,∆x,R, P ) = p0(β∆x+ ρR1+µP +
v) + (1− p0)(β∆x+ µP + v).
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expect that it would have entailed some amount of liberalization such that R0 ≤ 0.117
Finally, examining the importance of the PTA variable differently, we see that the ex-
plained amount of variation in the tariffs across goods which can be attributed to it is
significantly higher than the rest of the variables. For instance, changes in both the polit-
ical economy variable and MFN-externality proxy contribute to about a 5 percent average
predicted reduction in tariffs, whereas reciprocity contributes to only a 0.4 percent change
relative to a situation where all of them remain unchanged.
3.3.5 Robustness Analysis
We now show whether the results in Table 17 are robust to measurement error in the PTA
variable, the inclusion of initial tariffs as an explanatory variable and the estimation method.
We summarize the results in Table 19, where the column labeled “IV-GMM” repeats the
basic information from Table 17 for ease of comparison. The first row simply gives the co-
efficient on the PTA variable and the third row, labeled 1+φ/c, provides the quantification
discussed in the previous section, both of which refer to specification 1 in Table 17-Panel
A. The remaining rows provide the test statistics for whether products with a positive pref-
erential tariff or from countries with a CET generate a stumbling block; they refer to the
specifications in columns 1 and 2 of Table 17-Panel B, respectively.
In defining whether a PTA partner exported a particular product to the EU, we em-
ployed a low positive value as a threshold to minimize classification errors in recording the
product code for low value shipments.106 Although we expect this threshold to ameliorate
any measurement error from misclassification, it also increases the control group of non-
PTA goods and, if no classification error were present, this procedure could itself generate
117The estimates above provide not only information on the bounds of the EU’s tariffs but also on the
likelihood that PTAs had a negative impact on liberalization through reciprocity. To see this more clearly start
by assuming no difference, p1 = p0, and R1 = R0, and then ask whether the total estimated effect contradicts
this assumption. Since even with p1R1 = p0R0 we estimate that the EU’s PTAs caused an increase in its
average tariff through the direct effect, it is then plausible that the observed reciprocal tariff reduction of other
countries was smaller than it would have been under no PTAs. This suggests that p1R1 > p0R0. From this
perspective, reciprocity effects may have amplified the stumbling block effect of PTAs.
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a measurement error. Therefore, we repeat our estimations without applying any threshold,
e.g. setting Iany0 equal to 1 if any value of a good from any of the PTA partners entered
the EU under a preferential tariff rate and find that the coefficients in Table 17 are robust
to this in terms of their sign and significance without major changes in the magnitudes of
coefficients and the stumbling block effect (Table 19, column 2).
We do not expect our estimates to be biased due to omitted variables because, as we
argue above, even if they are correlated with the included regressors we instrument, test,
and confirm the orthogonality of the excluded instruments relative to the error term. Nev-
ertheless, we want to explicitly address the effect of including the initial tariff rate in the
estimation. The average initial MFN tariff for PTA products in our sample is 7.6 percent,
whereas it is 12.8 percent for the non-PTA products. Although in the UR no explicit for-
mula was followed such that higher tariffs would be cut by more than the lower ones, it is
certainly a possible outcome and may lead us to find bigger cuts in the non-PTA products.
When we add the initial tariff level as a regressor, we find that its coefficient is typically
negative, so products with higher initial tariffs had slightly bigger cuts, but it is not always
statistically significant. Moreover, the initial tariff does not affect the sign, magnitude or
significance of the basic stumbling block effect. As shown in column 3 of Table 19 the
relative growth effect evaluated at the average initial tariff is at least as large as the ones
found in Table 17. Since the main results are not sensitive to the inclusion of the initial
tariff and, according to the Schwarz criterion, the specification without it is preferred, we
choose to focus on the latter, which also follows our theoretical model more closely.
In the majority of the SIC three-digit industries there are both PTA and non-PTA prod-
ucts as can be observed in Table 16. The percentage of the PTA products in each sector
varies somewhat and substantially differs for a number of industries. The food products
industry, SIC 311, contains approximately half of all the products in our sample that do
not enter the EU duty-free through preferential agreements. Although this category does
not include primary agricultural products (it includes processing of food related products),
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it does share one important characteristic with agriculture: high protection. To the extent
that this feature is time-invariant, then it is immediately addressed by the fact that we esti-
mate the equations in differences. Moreover, the initial tariff, which is on average higher
for SIC 311 than other industries, does not seem to be biasing the results, because, as we
have seen, its inclusion does not affect the results significantly. To investigate whether the
stumbling block effect is merely driven by a cross-industry difference in the average tar-
iff cut between SIC 311 and other industries, we re-estimate the model by dropping the
observations in 311. In column 4 of Table 19 we see that the estimates are qualitatively
similar to those in Table 17 in terms of the signs and significance of the coefficients.118,119
In Table 16, we observe that there is a lot more variation in the products imported under all
PTA programs (for which Ievy0 = 1). These constitute 13% of all the products and actually
indicate a larger stumbling block effect.
As we argue in Section 3.3.1, there are good reasons to expect the main regressors to be
subject to endogeneity, either through reverse causation or correlation with omitted vari-
ables. Thus, we report the IV results and, to test if endogeneity is present, we calculate
the Hausman statistic. The probability values to reject the null of consistency of the OLS
estimates range from 0.04 to 0.52 across different specifications.120 Given that the tests
were overall inconclusive and we want to maintain comparability across different specifi-
cations, we have focused on the IV estimates, which may be inefficient but consistent over
all regressions. However, we also calculated the OLS counterpart to each specification and
found that the results were qualitatively similar to the IV estimates. In Table 19, we pro-
vide the summary statistics from the OLS estimation that confirm the main prediction of
118The point estimates of the relative growth effect in the basic specification are different when we ex-
clude products in SIC 311 but the 95 percent confidence intervals overlap with those of the corresponding
specification in Table 17.
119Separately, we also tested dropping the observations for petroleum refineries (SIC 353) and miscella-
neous petroleum and coal products (SIC 354) since production data for these sensitive sectors tends to be
inaccurate and in some cases missing. They account for less than 0.8 percent of all products in the sample
and so dropping them does not affect the results.
120More specifically, we calculate the Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic–reported in Table 17 (both Panel A and
Panel B) in the row labeled “Endogeneity p-val”. The value of 0.04 applies to the equivalent of specification
2 from Table 17-Panel B when the initial tariffs are added as a regressor.
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the model as well as one of the two auxiliary predictions.121Pagan and Hall’s (1983) het-
eroskedasticity tests reject the error terms to be homoskedastic, hence the GMM approach
is further justified.
Although we test and verify the exogeneity of the NTB variables as instruments, we
note that the presence of NTBs in a product could intuitively affect the subsequent change
in tariffs. Therefore, we test the sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of the NTB
variables and find that excluding them does not change the results.
3.4 Final Remarks
In this chapter, we analyze the effects of PTAs on multilateral trade liberalization–a con-
troversial issue where the evidence has been scarce. The model we develop captures key
features of the current trading system and provides a rich set of predictions regarding the
impact of PTAs on MTL. We derive and estimate the structural equations of protection us-
ing detailed tariff data for the EU during the last two multilateral rounds and find evidence
that its PTAs slowed down MTL. As the model predicts, this occurred only in products
with a zero preferential tariff and was not present in agreements with a common external
tariff and transfers. Our model also incorporates domestic political economy motives for
tariffs and we find a negative relation between import penetration and tariff levels work-
ing through the extra weight that governments place on producer surplus. We also find
evidence of reciprocity in the EU’s MTL.
In the absence of its PTAs the EU would have lowered its MFN tariff on PTA products
by an additional 1.5 percentage points. Since the average reduction for non-PTA products
was almost twice as high, the average price effect due to the EU’s multilateral tariff changes
was 50-60 percent for PTA goods relative to other goods. We also discussed how this
wedge between PTA and non-PTA products provides an estimate of the effect of PTAs on
121More specifically we estimate Cragg’s (1983) “heteroskedastic OLS”, which is more efficient than OLS
in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form because it uses the orthogonality conditions of the
excluded instruments. The excluded instruments are the same we use for the IV estimates.
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the expected average reductions in all products relative to a situation where the EU has no
PTAs and showed that the effect was at least 1.2 percentage points.
The evidence for the US and the EU suggest that we should be concerned about a “clash
of liberalizations”. Similar work is required for other countries. However, even if the EU
and the US turn out to be the exception, this concern would still have to be addressed
because their share of world trade implies that their PTAs have a potentially large impact
on non-members. These estimates suggest that the stumbling block effect may be even
worse for the Doha round, which is currently under negotiation. The motive is simple,
after the UR preferences for existing and new PTAs were greatly expanded, partly as a way
to counter the preference erosion generated by the lower MFN tariffs. The inevitable final
question is what, if anything, can be done to minimize this clash. The current enthusiasm
for PTAs means that prohibiting them is not feasible and we have not shown that doing
so would necessarily be optimal either. However, there may be ways to grant preferential
treatment that do not slow down MTL. Recall that, according to the model, the effect
of PTAs on MTL only occurs when the preferential tariff is zero and cannot be lowered
further. From this perspective the answer is simple: remove the non-negativity constraint
on preferential tariffs and allow import subsidies. Limão and Olarreaga (2005) estimate that
the additional MTL thus permitted generates a Pareto improvement for the three groups
of countries: non-members, preference granting and receiving countries. This or other
proposals that target the source of the problem and take into account the effects on these
three groups of countries are the most likely to be accepted by them and minimize any





TABLE 1. Spearman’s Rank Correlation Matrix for Tariffs over Time 
 
 τ1983 τ1985 τ1988 τ1989 τ1990 τ1991 τ1992 τ1993 τ1994 τ1995 τ1996 τ1997
τ1985 0.928 1           
τ1988 0.861 0.953 1          
τ1989 0.862 0.954 0.997 1         
τ1990 0.806 0.925 0.952 0.954 1        
τ1991 0.733 0.823 0.830 0.847 0.893 1       
τ1992 0.688 0.764 0.771 0.768 0.795 0.866 1      
τ1993 0.700 0.761 0.773 0.770 0.779 0.861 0.993 1     
τ1994 0.688 0.763 0.777 0.778 0.797 0.876 0.997 0.991 1    
τ1995 0.720 0.794 0.801 0.807 0.828 0.898 0.986 0.978 0.989 1   
τ1996 0.727 0.847 0.874 0.882 0.897 0.857 0.885 0.874 0.887 0.922 1  
τ1997 0.732 0.852 0.882 0.882 0.907 0.859 0.887 0.876 0.889 0.925 0.999 1 
τ1998 0.724 0.845 0.874 0.882 0.899 0.856 0.888 0.877 0.889 0.924 0.998 0.999





TABLE 2. Summary Statistics for Tariffs over Time 
 
 





τ1983 78 0.427 0.221 0.516 0.09 1.15 
τ1985 78 0.377 0.148 0.393 0.059 0.70 
τ1988 78 0.347 0.155 0.448 0.07 0.70 
τ1989 75 0.344 0.155 0.451 0.07 0.70 
τ1990 76 0.297 0.115 0.386 0.07 0.50 
τ1991 74 0.211 0.093 0.442 0.016 0.35 
τ1992 68 0.134 0.045 0.334 0.05 0.20 
τ1993 65 0.135 0.046 0.343 0.05 0.20 
τ1994 63 0.136 0.045 0.333 0.05 0.20 
τ1995 65 0.136 0.046 0.334 0.043 0.20 
τ1996 67 0.139 0.046 0.333 0.048 0.20 
τ1997 66 0.140 0.046 0.332 0.048 0.20 
τ1998 67 0.140 0.045 0.323 0.048 0.20 









TABLE 3. Correlation Matrix for Tariffs and Productivity over Time 
 
 logτ1983 logτ1985 logτ1988 logτ1989 logτ1990 logτ1991 logτ1992 logτ1993 logτ1994 logτ1995 logτ1996 logτ1997 logτ1998 
logA1983 -0.187 -0.153 -0.064 -0.071 -0.049 0.003 -0.100 -0.117 -0.073 -0.088 -0.007 -0.014 0.007 
logA1985 -0.233** -0.179 -0.108 -0.116 -0.104 -0.076 -0.085 -0.097 -0.076 -0.108 0.012 0.008 0.028 
logA1988 -0.220* -0.237** -0.269** -0.211* -0.249** -0.198* -0.144 -0.151 -0.158 -0.226* -0.241** -0.244** -0.239* 
logA1989 -0.208* -0.217* -0.197* -0.199* -0.233** -0.206* -0.141 -0.125 -0.129 -0.196 -0.219* -0.223* -0.220* 
logA1990 -0.223* -0.241** -0.235** -0.229** -0.260** -0.253** -0.138 -0.135 -0.146 -0.198 -0.233* -0.231* -0.233* 
logA1991 -0.177 -0.195* -0.238** -0.224* -0.234** -0.268** -0.127 -0.124 -0.132 -0.203 -0.205 -0.204 -0.208* 
logA1992 -0.145 -0.156 -0.158 -0.162 -0.163 -0.251** -0.039 -0.054 -0.074 -0.199 -0.113 -0.112 -0.115 
logA1993 -0.170 -0.193 -0.200 -0.204 -0.229* -0.265** -0.161 -0.148 -0.163 -0.201 -0.257** -0.258** -0.260** 
logA1994 -0.195 -0.251** -0.263** -0.262** -0.308** -0.362*** -0.185 -0.161 -0.175 -0.218* -0.275** -0.271** -0.277** 
logA1995 -0.179 -0.225* -0.239* -0.238* -0.269** -0.346*** -0.154 -0.132 -0.147 -0.227* -0.225* -0.225* -0.227* 
logA1996 -0.180 -0.217* -0.245** -0.245** -0.257** -0.297** -0.141 -0.125 -0.144 -0.213* -0.241** -0.244** -0.247** 
logA1997 -0.167 -0.194 -0.226* -0.231* -0.241* -0.294** -0.146 -0.126 -0.143 -0.220* -0.225* -0.232* -0.234* 
logA1998 -0.206* -0.229* -0.272** -0.271** -0.294** -0.337*** -0.223* -0.205 -0.219* -0.265** -0.302** -0.307** -0.311** 
Note: logτt stands for the natural logarithm of the average 4-digit ISIC level tariff in year t, and logAt stands for the natural logarithm of the 














TABLE 4. Summary Statistics for All the Variables in the Estimations 
 
 Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
logτit 920 -1.646 0.641 -4.107 0.140 
∆logτit 840 -0.093 0.228 -1.971 1.583 
logτiteff 902 -1.128 0.884 -4.294 1.556 
∆logτiteff 821 -0.113 0.526 -12.613 2.377 
log(Qit/Mitεit) 920 0.248 2.376 -6.139 11.470 
∆log(Qit/Mitεit) 840 -0.098 0.641 -6.025 3.201 
logAit 920 1.508 0.590 0.091 4.097 
∆logAit 840 0.031 0.270 -1.951 2.154 
logCapital Share 920 -1.765 0.777 -5.549 0.598 
∆logCapital Share 840 0.027 0.324 -3.714 1.771 
logMaterials Prices 920 -0.067 0.267 -1.488 0.929 
∆logMaterials Prices 840 -0.018 0.134 -0.777 1.338 
logScale 920 11.726 1.489 5.595 16.264 
∆logScale 830 0.050 0.528 -5.107 3.488 
logUpstream TFP 920 1.523 0.140 1.206 2.096 
∆logUpstream TFP 840 0.017 0.067 -0.205 0.490 
Notes: The tariff data are not available for 1982, 1986, and 1987 so we start out with 1310 4-digit ISIC 
tariff lines. When we take into account the missing output figures (not present for the whole year of 1984), 
the sample reduces to 1004 observations. Finally, considering the other missing observations on the right-























TABLE 5. The Effect of Productivity on Tariffs  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
log(Qit/Mitεit) 0.390*** 0.606*** 0.864*** 
(β1>0) (0.073) (0.142) (0.173) 
logAit 0.271*** 0.386*** 0.551*** 
(β2>0) (0.066) (0.097) (0.116) 
UNILIBt -0.533***   
(β3<0) (0.065)   
REFt  -0.492***  
(ρ1<0)  (0.035)  
POSTREFt  -0.306**  
(ρ2<0)  (0.154)  
Constant -1.536*** -1.884*** -2.186*** 
 (0.190) (0.269) (0.296) 
Year Effects No No Yes 
Observations 920 920 920 
Chi2-test p-val for all µi=0 a 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chi2-test p-val for all θt=0 b n/a n/a 0.000 
Hansen’s J p-val c 0.144 0.180 0.933 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the advalorem tariff rate (logτit).      
(4) The predicted signs for the coefficients of the regressors are indicated in parentheses below them.        
(5) All regressions include 4-digit ISIC industry dummies as regressors but are not reported. (6) List of 
instruments (all in logs): Capital share, materials prices (deviated from the producer price index), measure 
of scale economies (value added/number of firms), and the TFP of upstream sectors.  
a “Chi2-test p-val for all µi=0” provides the probability value for the Chi-squared test of H0: All µi (industry 
fixed effects) are jointly insignificant.  
b “Chi2-test p-val for all θt =0” provides the probability value for the Chi-squared test of H0: All θt (year 
effects) are jointly insignificant.  
c “Hansen’s J p-val” provides the probability value for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions for H0: Excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from 





















TABLE 6. The Effect of Productivity Differences on Tariff Differences 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆log(Qit/Mitεit) 0.190 0.514* 0.449** 
(β1>0) (0.726) (0.290) (0.213) 
∆logAit 0.231 0.519** 0.476** 
(β2>0) (0.658) (0.263) (0.209) 
∆UNILIBt -0.120***   
(β3<0) (0.031)   
REFt  -0.185*** -0.231*** 
(φ <0)  (0.069) (0.045) 
Constant   0.031* 
   (0.016) 
Observations 676 676 676 
Hansen’s J p-val a 0.572 0.929 0.958 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) The dependent variable is the one year change in the natural logarithm of the 
advalorem tariff rate (logτit). (4) The predicted signs for the coefficients of the regressors are indicated in 
the parentheses below them. (5) List of instruments (all in logs): First differences of capital share, materials 
prices (deviated from the producer price index), measure of scale economies (value added/number of firms), 
and the TFP of upstream sectors. (6) All estimations allow for arbitrary intra-industry correlation over time. 
a “Hansen’s J p-val” provides the probability value for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions for H0: Excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from 























TABLE 7. The Effect of Productivity on the Effective Rates of Protection  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
log(Qit/Mitεit) 0.333*** 0.270* 0.303** 
(β1>0) (0.084) (0.142) (0.139) 
logAit 0.261*** 0.190** 0.198** 
(β2>0) (0.070) (0.091) (0.096) 
UNILIBt -0.598***   
(β3<0) (0.079)   
REFt  -0.500***  
(ρ1<0)  (0.045)  
POSTREFt  -0.715***  
(ρ2<0)  (0.165)  
Year Effects No No Yes 
Constant -0.415** -0.207 -0.066 
(α>0) (0.198) (0.363) (0.342) 
Observations 887 887 887 
Chi2-test p-val for all µi=0 a 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chi2-test p-val for all θt=0 b n/a n/a 0.000 
Hansen’s J p-val c 0.004 0.001 0.000 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the effective rate of protection 
(logτiteff). (4) The predicted signs for the coefficients of the regressors are indicated in parentheses below 
them. (5) All regressions include 4-digit ISIC industry dummies as regressors but are not reported. (6) List 
of instruments (all in logs): Capital share, materials prices (deviated from the producer price index), 
measure of scale economies (value added/number of firms), and the TFP of upstream sectors.  
a “Chi2-test p-val for all µi=0” provides the probability value for the Chi-squared test of H0: All µi (industry 
fixed effects) are jointly insignificant.  
b “Chi2-test p-val for all θt =0” provides the probability value for the Chi-squared test of H0: All θt (year 
effects) are jointly insignificant.  
c “Hansen’s J p-val” provides the probability value for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions for H0: Excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from 

























TABLE 8. The Effect of Productivity Differences on the Effective Rate of Protection 
Differences 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
∆log(Qit/Mitεit) 0.337 0.553 0.519* 
(β1>0) (0.838) (0.337) (0.269) 
∆logAit 0.297 0.504* 0.490* 
(β2>0) (0.758) (0.294) (0.251) 
∆UNILIBt -0.105***   
(β3<0) (0.040)   
REFt  -0.182** -0.223*** 
(φ<0)  (0.089) (0.065) 
Constant   0.032 
   (0.021) 
Observations 652 652 652 
Hansen’s J p-val a 0.482 0.695 0.765 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) The dependent variable is the one year change in the natural logarithm of the 
effective rate of protection (logτiteff). (4) The predicted signs for the coefficients of the regressors are 
indicated in the parentheses below them. (5) List of instruments (all in logs): First differences of capital 
share, materials prices (deviated from the producer price index), measure of scale economies (value 
added/number of firms), and the TFP of upstream sectors. (6) All estimations allow for arbitrary intra-
industry correlation over time. 
a “Hansen’s J p-val” provides the probability value for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions for H0: Excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from 






















TABLE 9. The Effect of Past Productivity on Current Tariffs 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
log(Qit/Mitεit) 0.586*** 0.518*** 0.351*** 
(β1>0) (0.116) (0.118) (0.101) 
logAit-1 0.186** 0.168** 0.205*** 
(β2>0) (0.088) (0.080) (0.067) 
UNILIBt -0.361***   
(β3<0) (0.104)   
REFt  -0.494***  
(ρ1<0)  (0.044)  
POSTREFt  -0.381***  
(ρ2<0)  (0.139)  
Constant -2.207*** -2.058*** -1.610*** 
 (0.289) (0.293) (0.239) 
Year Effects No No Yes 
Observations 895 895 895 
Chi2-test p-val for all µi=0 a 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Chi2-test p-val for all θt=0 b n/a n/a 0.000 
Hansen’s J p-val c 0.406 0.061 0.056 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the advalorem tariff rate (logτit).      
(4) The predicted signs for the coefficients of the regressors are indicated in parentheses below them.        
(5) All regressions include 4-digit ISIC industry dummies as regressors but are not reported. (6) List of 
instruments (all in logs): Capital share, materials prices (deviated from the producer price index), one 
period lag of the measure of scale economies (value added/number of firms), and one period lag of the TFP 
of upstream sectors.  
a “Chi2-test p-val for all µi=0” provides the probability value for the Chi-squared test of H0: All µi (industry 
fixed effects) are jointly insignificant.  
b “Chi2-test p-val for all θt =0” provides the probability value for the Chi-squared test of H0: All θt (year 
effects) are jointly insignificant.  
c “Hansen’s J p-val” provides the probability value for the Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying 
restrictions for H0: Excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from 












TABLE 10. The Effect of Productivity on Tariffs and Effective Rates of Protection: OLS 
Results 
 
 (1) (2) 
 logτit logτiteff 
log(Qit/Mitεit) 0.125*** 0.134*** 
(β1>0) (0.015) (0.019) 
logAit 0.046 0.071 
(β2>0) (0.032) (0.046) 
UNILIBt -0.731*** -0.741*** 
(β3<0) (0.024) (0.031) 
Constant 3.418*** 0.199** 
(α>0) (0.078) (0.092) 
Observations 920 887 
R2 0.823 0.842 
Wald test p-val a 0.000 0.000 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) logτit is the natural logarithm of the advalorem tariff rate, and logτiteff is the natural 
logarithm of the effective rate of protection. (4) The predicted signs for the coefficients of the regressors 
are indicated in the parentheses below them. (5) The estimates include 4-digit ISIC industry dummies as 
regressors but are not reported.  




TABLE 11. The Effect of Productivity Differences on Tariff and Effective Rate of 
Protection Differences: OLS Results 
 
 (1) (2) 
 ∆logτit ∆logτiteff 
∆log(Qit/Mitεit) 0.076*** 0.084*** 
(β1>0) (0.022) (0.031) 
∆logAit 0.079* 0.071 
(β2>0) (0.046) (0.066) 
∆UNILIBt -0.128*** -0.113*** 
(β3<0) (0.017) (0.031) 
Observations 676 652 
R2 0.056 0.042 
Wald test p-val a 0.000 0.021 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) ∆logτit is the one year change in the natural logarithm of the advalorem tariff rate, 
and ∆logτiteff is the one year change in the natural logarithm of the effective rate of protection. (4) The 
predicted signs for the coefficients of the regressors are indicated in the parentheses below them. (5) All 
estimations allow for arbitrary intra-industry correlation over time. 
















TABLE 12. First Stage Regressions: Table 5 Column 1 Specification 
 
 log(Qit/Mitεit) logAit 
UNILIBt -0.686*** 0.097*** 
 (0.0672) (0.020) 
logCapital Share -0.109 -0.334*** 
 (0.069) (0.020) 
logMaterials Prices 0.432*** 0.008 
 (0.159) (0.047) 
logScale -0.139*** 0.187*** 
 (0.0458) (0.013) 
logUpstream TFP -0.901*** 0.435*** 
 (0.303) (0.088) 
Constant 4.531*** -2.164*** 
 (0.703) (0.205) 
Observations 920 920 
R2 0.897 0.858 
Adjusted R2 0.887 0.844 
Shea’s partial R2 0.033 0.434 
Wald test p-val a 0.000 0.000 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) These first stage regressions refer to the main tariff specification in column 1 of 
Table 5. (4) The dependent variables are indicated in the header row of each column.  


























TABLE 13. First Stage Regressions: Table 6 Column 1 Specification 
 
 ∆log(Qit/Mitεit) ∆logAit 
∆UNILIBt -0.064 0.053** 
 (0.075) (0.026) 
∆logCapital Share 0.379*** -0.405*** 
 (0.085) (0.030) 
∆logMaterials Prices 0.017 -0.061 
 (0.183) (0.064) 
∆logScale -0.077* 0.103*** 
 (0.045) (0.016) 
∆logUpstream TFP 0.345 0.004 
 (0.377) (0.132) 
Observations 676 676 
R2 0.041 0.289 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.283 
Shea’s partial R2 0.002 0.014 
Wald test p-val a 0.000 0.000 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) These first stage regressions refer to the main first-differenced tariff specification in 
column 1 of Table 6. (4) The dependent variables are indicated in the header row of each column.  

























TABLE 14. Tariffs and Productivity: A System of Equations 
 
 OLS   3SLS  
 logAit  logAit logτit log(Qit/Mitεit) 
logτit -0.066***  -0.067***  1.869*** 
 (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.107) 
log(Qit/Mitεit)    0.362***  
    (0.096)  
logAit    0.198***  
    (0.057)  
logCapital Share     1.038*** 
     (0.082) 
logMaterials Prices     1.041*** 
     (0.241) 
logScale 0.246***  0.245***   
 (0.029)  (0.014)   
logUpstream TFP 0.260***  0.257***   
 (0.092)  (0.096)   
Constant -1.842***  -1.828*** -1.612*** 5.227*** 
 (0.321)  (0.219) (0.229) (0.239) 
Observations 920  920 920 920 
R2 0.812  0.812 0.770 0.338 
Wald test p-val 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) The dependent variables are indicated in the header row of each column. (4) The  
logAit equations include industry dummies, GDP growth, and inflation as controls which are not reported 
here. The logτit equation includes both industry and year dummies which are not reported. 






















TABLE 15. Effective Rates of Protection and Productivity: A System of Equations 
 
 OLS   3SLS  
 logAit  logAit logτiteff log(Qit/Mitεit) 
logτiteff -0.059***  -0.069***  1.513*** 
 (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.080) 
log(Qit/Mitεit)    0.468***  
    (0.127)  
logAit    0.320***  
    (0.074)  
logCapital Share     1.074*** 
     (0.082) 
logMaterials Prices     0.966*** 
     (0.239) 
logScale 0.247***  0.247***   
 (0.029)  (0.014)   
logUpstream TFP 0.265***  0.247**   
 (0.092)  (0.098)   
Constant -1.767***  -1.729*** -0.545* 3.906*** 
 (0.332)  (0.229) (0.302) (0.183) 
Observations 887  887 887 887 
R2 0.809  0.809 0.756 0.363 
Wald test p-val 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are in parentheses. (2) *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. (3) The dependent variables are indicated in the header row of each column. (4) The  
logAit equations include industry dummies, GDP growth, and inflation as controls which are not reported 
here. The logτiteff equation includes both industry and year dummies which are not reported. 
a Wald test p-val provides the probability value for the Chi-squared-test of H0: The regressors are jointly 
insignificant. 
 
TABLE 16. Tariffs and PTA-good Indicators in the EU by Industry 
SIC  Before UR  After UR  The Change  Iany0 Ievy0 No. of 
Code Sector Mean Std.Dv. Mean Std.Dv.  Mean Std.Dv. Coef.Var.a  Mean Mean obsb 
311 Food products    0.161 0.087  0.114 0.073  0.047 0.026 0.553  0.437 0.000 419 
313 Beverages     0.108 0.038  0.073 0.021  0.035 0.018 0.514  0.800 0.000 5 
314 Tobacco     0.422 0.195  0.252 0.118  0.17 0.089 0.524  0.250 0.000 4 
321 Textiles     0.096 0.03  0.069 0.023  0.026 0.02 0.769  0.987 0.120 853 
322 Wearing apparel except footwear  0.126 0.026  0.109 0.025  0.017 0.008 0.471  0.997 0.501 375 
323 Leather products    0.051 0.023  0.034 0.023  0.016 0.009 0.563  1.000 0.373 83 
324 Footwear except rubber or plastic 0.095 0.048  0.087 0.04  0.008 0.012 1.500  1.000 0.243 37 
331 Wood products except furniture  0.056 0.022  0.02 0.025  0.036 0.011 0.306  0.878 0.068 74 
332 Furniture except metal   0.058 0.007  0.012 0.017  0.046 0.013 0.283  1.000 0.406 32 
341 Paper and products   0.088 0.02  0.044 0.018  0.044 0.017 0.386  0.982 0.114 167 
342 Printing and publishing   0.093 0.032  0.047 0.024  0.047 0.017 0.362  1.000 0.143 21 
351 Industrial chemicals    0.08 0.029  0.055 0.015  0.025 0.027 1.080  0.950 0.016 767 
352 Other chemicals    0.067 0.018  0.031 0.03  0.036 0.029 0.806  0.961 0.071 254 
353 Petroleum refineries    0.046 0.02  0.03 0.018  0.015 0.008 0.533  0.795 0.000 39 
354 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 0.039 0.023  0.026 0.034  0.013 0.011 0.846  0.900 0.000 10 
355 Rubber products    0.053 0.023  0.034 0.023  0.019 0.01 0.526  1.000 0.170 53 
356 Plastic products    0.111 0.048  0.084 0.046  0.027 0.017 0.630  1.000 0.165 97 
361 Pottery china earthenware   0.078 0.027  0.06 0.025  0.019 0.011 0.579  1.000 0.571 21 
362 Glass and products   0.074 0.029  0.048 0.031  0.026 0.012 0.462  0.968 0.064 125 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products  0.045 0.021  0.021 0.017  0.024 0.009 0.375  1.000 0.063 95 
371 Iron and steel   0.057 0.018  0.004 0.012  0.054 0.021 0.389  0.926 0.000 435 
372 Non-ferrous metals    0.061 0.024  0.041 0.027  0.021 0.014 0.667  0.963 0.000 163 
381 Fabricated metal products   0.057 0.019  0.031 0.016  0.026 0.013 0.500  0.992 0.117 384 
382 Machinery except electrical   0.045 0.013  0.02 0.014  0.025 0.012 0.480  0.990 0.140 776 
383 Machinery electric    0.063 0.025  0.034 0.021  0.029 0.016 0.552  0.990 0.263 312 
384 Transport equipment    0.077 0.047  0.053 0.05  0.024 0.018 0.750  0.972 0.143 217 
385 Professional and scientific equipment  0.062 0.014  0.028 0.016  0.034 0.014 0.412  1.000 0.255 251 
390 Other manufactured products   0.063 0.017  0.029 0.015  0.034 0.017 0.500  0.996 0.236 225 
 Total 0.079 0.046  0.049 0.042  0.03 0.022 0.733  0.939 0.133 6294 
Advalorem tariff rates are reported. The total number of observations in our sample is equal to 6294. Note that the products with zero initial tariff rates are excluded from 
the sample as explained in the text. (a) Stands for coefficient of variation. (b) Number of observations for Iany0 and Ievy0 in each SIC 3-digit sector.
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TABLE 17. Stumbling Block Estimates 
Panel A: Main Estimations 
 IV-GMM  HOLS 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Iany0 0.015*** 0.015***  0.013*** 0.013*** 
( φ any0>0) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Ievy0  0.007***   0.004*** 
( φ evy0>0)   (0.002)   (0.001) 
∆x 0.004* 0.003**  0.000 0.000 
( β >0) (0.002) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
R 0.006* 0.005*  0.010*** 0.009*** 
( ρ >0) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.002) 
P 0.001 0.000  0.001* 0.000 
( µ >0) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.034*** -0.034***  -0.038*** -0.038*** 
(c) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 6294 6294  6294 6294 
Schwarz Criterion -7.58 -7.60  -7.68 -7.68 
Hansen's J p-val a 0.506 0.567  n/a n/a 
C-stat p-val b 0.729 0.562  n/a n/a 
Endogeneity p-val c 0.517 0.248  n/a n/a 
Heterosked. p-val d 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 








1+(φ  + φ all)/c e n/a 0.39 
(.21,.56) 
 n/a 0.56 
(.49 , .63) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Clustering at the 3-digit SIC level.  
The predicted signs for the coefficients of the variables are indicated in brackets below them.  
IV-GMM refers to the two-step efficient generalized method of moments estimator.  
HOLS refers to the heteroskedastic ordinary least squares estimator. 
(a) Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. Probability value for H0: Excluded instruments 
are uncorrelated with the error term, and correctly excluded from the estimated equation. (b) 
Difference-in Sargan (C) statistic. Probability value for H0: The subset of variables/instruments 
marked with “‡” in Table 2, 3, and 4 are exogenous. (c) Endogeneity test based on the C statistic for 
the main regressors. Probability value for H0: No endogeneity among regressors. (d) Pagan-Hall 
heteroskedasticity test. Probability value for H0: Disturbance is homoskedastic. (e) Confidence 





















TABLE 17. Stumbling Block Estimates 
Panel B: Auxiliary Estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Iany 0.013***    
( φ any>0)  (0.003)    
Ipos -0.026    
( φ pos+φ any=0) (0.032)    
Iany0  0.015*** 0.011***  
( φ any0>0)  (0.003) (0.002)  
Iafs ‡  0.002   
( φ afs=0)   (0.002)   
Ispg ‡  -0.001   
( φ spg=0)   (0.001)   
Ihiexp   0.005***  
( φ hiexp>0)    (0.002)  
Igsp †    0.003*** 
( φ gsp>0)     (0.001) 
Igspl †    0.003*** 
( φ gspl>0)    (0.001) 
Iacp    0.000 
( φ acp>0)    (0.001) 
Ieftx †    0.002*** 
( φ eftx>0)    (0.001) 
Imed    0.002*** 
( φ med>0)    (0.001) 
Icec †    0.002*** 
( φ cec>0)    (0.001) 
∆x 0.004* 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
( β >0) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
R 0.008* 0.006* 0.006** 0.008*** 
( ρ >0) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
P 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 
( µ >0) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant -0.030*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.028*** 
(c) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 6294 6294 6294 6294 
Schwarz Criterion -7.56 -7.60 -7.61 -7.64 
Hansen's J p-val a 0.559 0.495 0.569 0.159 
C-stat p-val b 0.446 0.722 0.553e 0.114 
Endogeneity p-val c 0.399 0.525 0.270 0.210 
Heterosked. p-val d 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1+ φ /c h 0.57  (.42,.72) 0.57  (.47,.66) 0.69  (.56,.81) n/a 
1+(φ  + φ hi)/c h n/a n/a 0.56 f  (.44, .68) 0.53 g  (.37, .69) 
φ pos+φ any=0 p-val 0.68 (accept) n/a n/a n/a 
Estimation method is IV-GMM. †: the following coefficient restrictions in place, φ gsp =φ gspl, φ eftx =φ cec, based on a 
test failing to reject their equality. (a) Hansen-Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. Probability value for H0: 
Excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, and correctly excluded from the estimated equation. (b) 
Difference-in Sargan (C) statistic. Probability value for H0: The subset of variables/instruments marked with “‡” in 
Table 2, 3, and 4 are exogenous. (c) Endogeneity test based on the C statistic for the main regressors. Probability value 
for H0: No endogeneity among regressors. (d) Pagan-Hall heteroskedasticity test. Probability value for H0: Disturbance 
is homoskedastic. (e) The following extra instruments are tested for this specification: Dhiexp, DntballxDhiexp for which the 
first stage regression results are similar to those in Table 3 but not reported. (f) The value for the combined effect of 
Iany0 and Ihiexp.  (g) Calculated for a product exported under every program. The other values, with confidence intervals 
in brackets, are GSP and GSPL: 0.88 (.82, .94), ACP: 0.99 (.93, 1.06), MED: 0.92 (.87, .97), EFTX and CEC: 0.93 
(.88, .97). (h) Confidence intervals calculated using the delta method.
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TABLE 18. First Stage Regressions  
(Any and Every PTA Specifications) 
 Table 2-Panel A-Column 1  Table 2-Panel A-Column 2 
 Iany0 ∆x R  Iany0 Ievy0 ∆x R 
Danyexp ‡ 0.936*** -0.866*** 0.021***  0.933*** -0.003 -0.774*** 0.020*** 
 (0.023) (0.217) (0.007)  (0.023) (0.020) (0.215) (0.007) 
Devyexp ‡     0.035*** 0.801*** -0.755*** 0.013*** 
     (0.007) (0.006) (0.063) (0.002) 
Dntball ‡ 0.008 -0.888** -0.010  0.013 -0.014 -0.974** -0.009 
 (0.041) (0.388) (0.012)  (0.041) (0.036) (0.383) (0.012) 
DntballxDanyexp ‡ -0.229*** 0.506 0.010  -0.251*** 0.000 0.319 0.009 
 (0.042) (0.392) (0.012)  (0.041) (0.036) (0.389) (0.012) 
DntballxDevyexp ‡     0.190*** -0.109*** 1.497*** 0.012* 
     (0.026) (0.022) (0.240) (0.007) 
∆p9294 -0.003 0.051 -0.004**  -0.002 -0.001 0.035 -0.004** 
 (0.006) (0.059) (0.002)  (0.006) (0.005) (0.059) (0.002) 
(∆p9294)2 -0.009*** -0.005 0.000  -0.007*** 0.000 -0.024 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.028) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.027) (0.001) 
(∆p9294)3 0.002* -0.007 0.000  0.002* 0.000 -0.004 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.009) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.000) 
Dntb ‡ 0.051*** 1.014*** 0.025***  0.049*** 0.020*** 1.072*** 0.024*** 
 (0.006) (0.060) (0.002)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.059) (0.002) 
∆scale 0.189*** -0.497*** -0.032***  0.190*** 0.003 -0.550*** -0.031*** 
 (0.009) (0.082) (0.002)  (0.009) (0.008) (0.081) (0.002) 
(∆p9294)avgx∆scale ‡ -0.362*** -0.917 0.102***  -0.285*** -0.017 -1.465* 0.119*** 
 (0.085) (0.803) (0.024)  (0.085) (0.074) (0.797) (0.024) 
Runi  0.041** -0.075 0.754***  0.042** 0.024 -0.058 0.754*** 
 (0.017) (0.163) (0.005)  (0.017) (0.015) (0.161) (0.005) 
P 0.039*** -0.274*** -0.004***  0.036*** 0.003 -0.252*** -0.005*** 
 (0.005) (0.046) (0.001)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.045) (0.001) 
Constant -0.039* -1.129*** -0.275***  -0.042* 0.003 -1.084*** -0.275*** 
 (0.024) (0.222) (0.007)  (0.023) (0.020) (0.219) (0.007) 
Observations 6294 6294 6294  6294 6294 6294 6294 
R-squared 0.379 0.079 0.792  0.390 0.767 0.102 0.794 
Adj. R2 0.378 0.078 0.792  0.389 0.767 0.100 0.794 
Shea's partial R2 0.323 0.066 0.780  0.342 0.670 0.082 0.783 
F statistic 348.89 49.26 2178.40  308.61 1593.15 54.63 1863.06 
F-test p-val a 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F statistic excluded 362.23 50.35 2395.79  316.06 1713.12 55.90 2017.93 
F-test excl. p-val b 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Clustering at the 3-digit SIC level.  
‡: the subset of instruments further tested for exogeneity. The probability value for the difference-in Sargan (C) 
statistics for these instruments are reported on the row labeled C-stat p-val. in Table 2.  
(a)  Probability value for the F–test of H0: The instruments are jointly insignificant. 
(b)  Probability value for the F–test of H0: The excluded instruments are jointly insignificant.  
TABLE 19. Robustness and Specification Analysis 







 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
[A.1] φ any0   
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[B.1] H0: φ pos + φ any =0  
         (p-val) 
Can’t reject 
(0.68) 
Can’t reject  
(0.78) 






[B.2] e  φ afs  (s.e)  











[1] Schwarz Criterion  -7.58 -7.60 -7.45 -7.68 -7.68 
Observations 6294 6294 6294 5875 6294 
The numbers in square brackets in the first cell of each row refer to the specification numbers from Table 2. 
IV-GMM refers to the two-step efficient generalized method of moments estimator.  
HOLS refers to the heteroskedastic ordinary least squares estimator. 
a. Measures the relative growth of world prices due to PTAs for imperfect pass-through (such that ζPTA ≈ ζ<1). Confidence intervals 
calculated using the delta method. 
b. The coefficient on the initial tariff variable (tt-1) for the three different specifications with the standard errors in brackets are [1]: -0.195 
(0.111), [3]: -0.151 (0.119), and [4]: -0.170 (0.115).   
c. Refers to the relative growth at the mean initial tariff i.e. 1+φ /(c+ 0.0789*φ ini). When we account for the different average initial tariffs,  
0.0757 when Iany0=1 and 0.128 otherwise, that is calculate  (c+ 0.0757*φ ini +φ ) /(c+ 0.128*φ ini), we obtain 0.26 (-.09, .61).  
d. The 95% confidence interval for Ipos + Iany  is [-0.0161, -0.0047] . 
e. The test of the combined effect φ afs+φ spg =0 yields the following p-values for columns (1) through (5) respectively: 0.84, 0.28, 0.29, 
0.58, 0.44. 
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TABLE 20. Summary Statistics 
Variable Name Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆t -0.030 0.022 -0.268 0.000 
Iany0 0.939 0.239 0 1 
Ievy0 0.133 0.339 0 1 
Iany 0.954 0.210 0 1 
Ipos 0.015 0.121 0 1 
Iafs 0.902 0.297 0 1 
Ispg 0.875 0.330 0 1 
Ihiexp 0.891 0.311 0 1 
Igsp 0.646 0.478 0 1 
Igspl 0.190 0.392 0 1 
Iacp 0.291 0.454 0 1 
Ieftx 0.870 0.337 0 1 
Imed 0.508 0.500 0 1 
Icec 0.671 0.470 0 1 
∆x -2.004 1.853 -13.884 5.466 
R -0.460 0.118 -0.960 0.000 
Danyexp 0.984 0.126 0 1 
Devyexp 0.167 0.373 0 1 
Dgsp 0.899 0.302 0 1 
Dgspl 0.224 0.417 0 1 
Dacp 0.333 0.471 0 1 
Deftx 0.904 0.294 0 1 
Dmed 0.594 0.491 0 1 
Dcec 0.852 0.355 0 1 
Dhiexp 0.948 0.221 0 1 
Runi -0.267 0.139 -0.922 0 
Dntb 0.288 0.453 0 1 
Dntball 0.096 0.295 0 1 
DntballxDanyexp 0.091 0.288 0 1 
DntballxDevyexp 0.010 0.101 0 1 
DntballxDgsp 0.069 0.253 0 1 
∆p9294 0.001 0.461 -3.912 4.874 
∆scale 0.307 0.322 -0.351 1.047 
(∆p9294)avgx∆scale 0.005 0.032 -0.053 0.126 
P 0.502 0.500 0 1 
tt-1 0.079 0.046 0.005 0.65 
The number of observations in our sample (n) is 6294. There are 8688 non-missing values for ∆t 
(the dependent variable), which is reduced to 7784 when we omit the lines with zero initial 
tariffs. Missing import and market access variables to construct the reciprocity variable reduce 
the sample to 6837, and missing price data to 6721. Production related data accounts for the 
















FIGURE 1.  Average Tariffs and Effective Rates of Protection in Colombia 1983-1998 
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FIGURE 2. Histogram of the Percentage Decline in Tariffs between 1983 and 1995 at the 4-
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Note: Tariff reduction is calculated as [log(1+τi1983)-log(1+ τi1995)]*100 
Source: DNP and author’s own calculations. 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Histogram of the Percentage Decline in Tariffs between 1988 and 1995 at the 4-












0 10 20 30 40
Tariff Reduction (%)
 
Note: Tariff reduction is calculated as [log(1+τi1988)-log(1+ τi1995)]*100 
Source: DNP and author’s own calculations. 
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FIGURE 4. Histogram of the Percentage Decline in Tariffs between 1983-1989 average and 
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Note: Tariff reduction is calculated as [log(1+avgτi1983-1988)-log(1+avgτi1992-1998)]*100 
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Identification of the Stumbling Block Effect through MFN Tariff Changes
 
Appendices
A Derivations for Chapter 1
Equation (2)
We maximize equation (1) with respect to τ i to obtain the following first order condition
∂G
∂τ i
= −Di(τ i) + ωAiQi(τ i) +Mi(τ i) + τ iM 0i(τ i)
= (ω − 1)AiQi(τ i) + τ iM 0i(τ i) (39)
Equating to zero and solving for τ i, and then dividing both sides of this expression by
pwi = 1 and using the following elasticity definition εi ≡ −M 0ipwi /Mi yields equation (2).
Equation (6)
In order to obtain equation (6), we implicitly differentiate the specific tariff version of τ i
as expressed in equation (5) with respect to α and use the linearity assumption for Mi (so







M 0i(τ i) + (ω − 1)AiQ0i(τ i) + ασ00i (τ i)
> 0 (40)
Equation (13)
The first order condition for a solution to equation (11) is
∂Et(Git + δGit+1)
∂τ it



















which after a few steps of manipulation becomes
∂Et(Git + δGit+1)
∂τ it





















Using equation (12) to substitute in for τ eit+1(τ it) and employing the definition in equation
(14), the first order condition simplifies to
∂Et(Git + δGit+1)
∂τ it
= (ω − 1)φitQit(τ it) + τ itM 0it + δωΛi = 0 (43)
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Dividing both sides of equation (43) by pwi = 1 and using the same elasticity term εi as
described above yields equation (13).
Equations (16a), (16b), and (16c)










φit+1Qit+1(τ it+1)dτ it+1 (44)
The relationships in equations (16a), (16b), and (16c) are then obtained by plugging equa-
tion (44) in equation (43) and differentiating τ it in equation (43) with respect to φit+1












M 0it + δωn(n− 1)φnit(Q0it)2(Qit)n−2
R 1+τeit+1
0
φit+1Qit+1dτ it+1 + (ω − 1)φitQ0it
> 0






















φit+1Qit+1dτ it+1 + (ω − 1)Qit
M 0it + δωn(n− 1)φnit(Q0it)2(Qit)n−2
R 1+τeit+1
0
φit+1Qit+1dτ it+1 + (ω − 1)φitQ0it
> 0
Equation (17)
The actual tariff in period t + 1 is similar to the one in equation (12) but now its terms
are not dependent on Xit, because I assume that the LBD process is realized to be a false
perception:
τ it+1 = (ω − 1)φit+1Qit+1(τ it+1)/Mit+1(τ it+1)
εit+1(τ it+1)
(48)
Now, by using equation (13) and equation (48), we can express the difference in tariff rates
between the two periods as
∆τ it+1 = τ it+1|n=0 − τ it|n>0 = − 1
M 0i

















(ω − 1)Qit+1(τ it+1)
M 0i(.) + (ω − 1)φit+1Q0it+1(τ it+1)
> 0 (50)
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B Data Details for Chapter 2
B.1 Import Demand Elasticity
In Chapter 1, I define the import demand elasticity, εi, as M 0ipwi /Mi but traditionally and in
the empirical data in Chapter 2 it is evaluated at the domestic prices, not the world prices.
I take this into account in obtaining the elasticity adjusted inverse import penetration ratio,
given the fact that ouput value is evaluated at the domestic prices, whereas imports are














I use the structural estimates from Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2004) to compute the import





+ sit − 1 (52)
where sit is the negative of the imports to GDP ratio and ai is an estimated structural price
parameter from a GDP function.
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B.2 Variable Definitions and Sources for Chapter 2
Name Definition Source 
τit Advalorem tariff rate (%): Obtained at the 8-digit 
product level (“Nabandina” code) and aggregated 
to the 4-digit ISIC level by simple averaging  
National Planning Department 
(DNP), Colombia 
τiteff Effective rate of protection (%): Obtained at the 8-
digit product level (“Nabandina” code) and 
aggregated to the 4-digit ISIC level by simple 
averaging 
National Planning Department 
(DNP), Colombia 
Xit Output values in 1000 USD at the 4-digit ISIC 
level 
UNIDO, Industrial Statistics 
Database 
Mit Import values in 1000 USD at the 4-digit ISIC 
level 
COMTRADE, United Nations 
Statistics Division 
εit Import demand elasticity at the 3-digit ISIC level: 
obtained by combining import and GDP data with 
estimated structural price parameters. 
Structural estimates (Kee et al. 
2004), GDP (World 
Development Indicators, 
World Bank), imports 
(COMTRADE). 
Ait Total factor productivity (TFP): Obtained at the 
firm level by estimating production function 
residuals with a 2SLS model. Aggregated from the 
firm to the 4-digit ISIC level by using production 
shares as weights. 
Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler 
and Kugler (2004) 
Capital 
Share 
Capital stock series obtained at the firm level using 
fixed assets, gross investment, “observed” 
depreciation rates, and a gross capital formation 
deflator. The ratio of capital stock to output is then 
aggregated to the 4-digit ISIC level by using firms’ 
production shares as weights. 
Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler 
and Kugler (2004) 
Materials 
Prices 
Obtained at the firm level using Tornqvist indices 
which are aggregated to the 4-digit ISIC level by 
using firms’ production shares as weights. 
Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler 
and Kugler (2004) 
Scale The ratio of total value added to the number of 
firms in a given 4-digit ISIC sector.  
Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler 
and Kugler (2004) 
Upstream 
TFP 
Using the input-output tables at the 3-digit ISIC 
level, I exclude the inputs being used from the own 
sector, and obtain the upstream measure based on a 
combination of TFPs of the remaining input 
sectors as weighted by their share of usage. 
Input-output tables (Nicita and 
Olarreaga 2001, originally 
from Global Trade Analysis 




The annual percentage change in the GDP 
(constant 2000 US dollars) 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World Bank
Inflation Annual percentage change in the GDP deflator World Development 
Indicators (WDI), World Bank
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C Derivations and Data Details for Chapter 3
C.1 Tariff Expressions
C.1.1 No Common External Tariff
Equation (28)
The tariff revenue expression in equation (26) depends on whether there is a PTA and the



























i −DSi ] CET
(53)
The first line applies if there is a PTA without a CET, and the second applies to the case of
a PTA with a CET or no PTA. They differ because in the absence of a CET the consumers
in Small purchase from the lowest cost supplier, Large*, so an amount DSi –previously
exported by Large* to Large–on which τ i was levied is now exported by Small to Large
and only πi is collected.
Consider good i = I , which is imported by Large from Large* and its symmetric coun-
terpart i = I + 1, exported to Large*. Using equation (26) and the first line in equation
(53) we simplify the first-order-condition (FOC) for an interior solution to equation (27)
and obtain




I − 1)d∗0I ]
−p0IMI − (p0∗I+1 − 1)MI+1 + (ωI − 1)p0IXI
= −[Hτ I(p0I − 1)d∗0I ]− (p0I − 1)MI (54)
−(p0∗I+1 − 1)MI+1 + (ωI − 1)p0IXI
where p0 ≡ ∂p/∂τ , d∗0 ≡ ∂d∗/∂p∗ and we use the market clearing condition in equation
(25) for I . Equating to zero, solving for τ I and using M∗0I = D∗0I (fixed supply) we obtain
τmI =
(ωI − 1)p0IXI − (p0I − 1)MI − (p0∗I+1 − 1)MI+1
(p0I − 1)M∗0I
(55)
By employing the symmetry, we have p0I = p0∗I+1. The symmetry also implies that MI =
M∗I+1 and M sI =Ms
∗
I+1, which, along with equation (25) implies M∗I+1+Ms
∗
I+1 = −MI+1,
so MI+1 = −(MI +MsI ). Finally, to obtain equation (28), we divide equation (55) by p∗I ,
use p0 =M∗0/[M∗0+M 0] (from implicit differentiation of equation (25) and M 0sI = 0) and
employ the following elasticity definitions: ε ≡ −M 0p∗/M and ε∗ ≡ [∂(M∗+M s)/∂p∗]×
[p∗/(M∗ +M s)] = [∂M∗/∂p∗]× [p∗/(M∗ +M s)].
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Equation (32)




+GτI +Gτ∗I+1 = [Ges
∂eb
∂τ I
−DsI −M∗I −Hτ I(p0I − 1)d∗0I ]
−p0I(D(pI(τ I))−XI)




−XsI −Hτ I(p0I − 1)d∗0I ] (56)
−(p0I − 1)MI − (p0∗I+1 − 1)MI+1 + (ωI − 1)p0IXI
where we use MsI ≡ DsI−XsI and equation (25). Equating to zero, solving for τ I and using
M∗0I = D
∗0
I (fixed supply) we obtain
τmpI =






To obtain equation (32) we apply the symmetry conditions described in the previous deriva-
tion, divide equation (57) by p∗I , employ the same elasticity definitions and use ∂eb/∂τ I =
δXsI/H from equation (30).
C.1.2 Common External Tariff and Direct Transfers
Allowing a transfer T from Large to Small when cooperation starts, the equilibrium level
of es for a given preference, τ 1 − π1, and transfer, T is122
ebcu = δ(T + (τ 1 − π1)(Xs1 −Ds1))/H (58)
The large countries maximize their joint objective net of transfers made to the regional
partner.
{τmcu, πpcu, T cu} ≡ argmax
τ,π,T
{G(τ ∗ = τ ,π, es, .)− T : π ≤ τ ; es = ebcu} (59)




≤ 0; Gπ +Ges ∂e
b
∂π




where we recall that G(.) is defined by equation (26) with the tariff revenue term given by
the second line in equation (53). Evaluating the FOC of the MFN tariff in the absence of
preferences, i.e. equation (54), at the level of the MFN tariff under the CU in equation (60)
122The incentive compatibility constraint for Small is now [Gs(π, τ , es = 0)+ T ]− [Gs(π, τ , es) + T ] ≤
δ
1−δ [G
s(π, τ , es)+T−Gs(π = τ , τ , es = 0)]whereGs is still defined by equation (29) but the consumption

















where the second line uses equation (58). In order to establish the last equality in equation
(61), we must show that the FOC for π in equation (60) is zero. Suppose it is not, such
that Gπ + Ges ∂e
b
∂π
= −Ms + (δM s/H)Ges = (−1 + δGes/H)M s < 0 when evaluated at
τmcu = τm. This implies that Large would gain by further lowering π but it can only do so
until it is zero. However, GT +Ges ∂e
b
∂T
= −1+δGes/H, which is positive if Gπ+Ges ∂eb∂π <
0. Thus τmcu = τm, T = 0 and π = 0 is not a solution. T must be increased until
−1+ δGes/H = 0, which implies that Gπ +Ges ∂eb∂π = 0. Therefore we obtain τmcu = τm,
T cu > 0 and π = πpcu < τmcu.
C.2 Data Sources and Definitions
• ∆t: The change in the bound advalorem MFN tariffs between the pre-Uruguay
Round (UR) and post-UR periods for the HS 8-digit product i. Source: WTO.
• Iany0 [Ievy0]: An indicator variable equal to 1, if good i is imported at a duty-free
preferential rate by EU under any [all] of its PTAs in 1994. It excludes PTAs in-
volving a common external tariff. Sources: Eurostat’s COMEXT (trade flows) and
UNCTAD’s TRAINS (preferential tariff rates).
• Iany [Ipos]: An indicator equal to 1, if good i is imported by the EU under any of its
PTAs at either a duty-free or positive preferential tariff rate [a positive preferential
rate only] in 1994. Sources: COMEXT, TRAINS.
• Iafs [Ispg]: An indicator equal to 1 if good i is imported by the EU from the “recent”
members Austria, Finland, or Sweden [Spain, Portugal, or Greece] in 1994. Source:
COMEXT.
• Ihi exp: An indicator equal to 1 if the exports of any of the PTA partners (excluding
the ones with CET) to the EU in good i is greater than the 25th percentile of its
exports to the EU and it is exported under the respective preferential program, i.e.
the interaction of Iany0 and Dhi exp (defined below). Sources: COMEXT, TRAINS.
• R ≡ Pk ski (Pj wkj∆tkj/tkjt): Reciprocity variable measuring changes in market ac-
cess provided by the major exporters of good i to the EU during the UR; where
∆tkj/t
k
jt is the percentage tariff reduction by country k /∈ EU in good j between 1986
and 1995, wkj is the 1992 import share of good j in total imports of k, and ski is the
exports of a principal supplier (a top 5 exporter) k to the EU in good i as a share of
total exports of good i from all of the EU’s principal suppliers. Sources: Finger et al.
(1999) and authors’ calculations from COMEXT.
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• Runi: Reciprocity variable computed only for the unilateral liberalization (between
1986 and 1992) by the major exporters to the EU. The computation is otherwise sim-
ilar to that of R. Sources: Finger et al. (1999), COMEXT and authors’ calculations.
• ∆x: The EU-wide change in the elasticity adjusted inverse import penetration ra-
tio between 1978 (pre-Tokyo Round) and 1992 (pre-UR), where xIt ≡ XIt/MItεIt
for each 3-digit SIC industry I. Computed using the members of the EU in 1978
– Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
United Kingdom. We employ the production value measured in domestic prices,
pItXIt, whereas the import values are measured at the world prices, p∗ItMIt. The
elasticity measure that we use is also evaluated at the domestic prices, hence we





ItpIt/MIt). The import demand elasticity we calculate, M 0ItpIt/MIt,
is for the EU as a whole, as required by the model. Following Kee et al. (2004) we
compute it as aII/sI + sI −1, where aII is an estimated structural price parameter in
the GDP function and sI is the EU’s import to GDP ratio in sector I . Sources: Kee
et al (2004) (aII); UNIDO ( pItXIt), COMTRADE and Penn World Tables (sI).
• P : Proxy for the change in the MFN externality effect, ∆m. Computed as a dummy
equal to one if the change in the share of the non-top 5 exporters in total exports to
the EU between 1989 and 1994 is above the median for an HS 8-digit good i. Source:
COMEXT.
• Ipta name: Indicator equal to 1, if good i is imported at a duty-free preferential rate by
EU under the “pta name” program, which includes GSP, GSPL, ACP, MED, CEC,
and EFTX. Sources: COMEXT and TRAINS.
• Dany exp [Devy exp]: Indicator equal to 1, if good i is imported by EU from any [all]
of its PTA partners in 1994 (regardless of whether they receive a preference or not).
Source: COMEXT.
• Dhi exp: An indicator equal to 1, if good i is an important export for a PTA partner
(greater than its 25th percentile of exports). Source: COMEXT.
• Dntb [Dntball]: An indicator equal to 1 if good i is subject to a non-tariff barrier that
applies to at least one exporter [all exporters] of good i to the EU. Source: TRAINS.
• ∆p9294, (∆p9294)2, (∆p9294)3: The change in the world price of good i (computed
using unit values) between 1992 and 1994 averaged over all of its exporters. Source:
COMEXT.
• ∆scale: The change in the EU-wide value added/number of firms between 1978 and
1992. Sources: UNIDO, and COMTRADE.
• (∆p9294)avgx∆scale: Interaction of∆p9294 averaged over sector i and∆scale. Sources:
UNIDO, and COMTRADE.
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Colonial ties major motivation. 
Financial and political cooperation; 
human rights play a role. (its earliest 





















Serves as a transition to full 
membership. Recipients committed 
to pass laws such as in intellectual 













EFTA members excluding AFS. 
Mainly industrial goods, excludes 

















Widest program; includes non-duty-
free rates. Preferential rates vary 





About 50 of the 
poorest nations 










Objective: Improving access to 
global markets for agricultural and 




















Cooperation in social affairs, 
migration, human rights, and 
democracy. Preferences on industrial 




















AFS: Austria (1995), Finland 
(1995), Sweden (1995). SPG: Spain 
(1986), Portugal (1986), Greece 
(1981). Accession years in brackets. 
1Romania and Bulgaria signed FTA agreements with the EU in 1993, hence should be part of the CEC category but they 
are not included in our analysis due to lack of data. 
2There exist special arrangements supporting measures to combat drugs under the GSP program. The recipients are the 
Andean group (Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia) and the Central American Common Market group 
(Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua). The extra concessions data for these groups is not 
available and hence they are considered only as part of the general GSP program. 
3Lebanon made a unilateral PTA arrangement with the EU in 1977 but it is not included in our estimations due to again 
lack of data. 
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